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ABSTRACT 
HABERMAS AND VIROLI ON CONSTITUTION AND PATRIA: A 
DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM 
 
 
ERDĠNÇ ERDEM 
Political Science, M.A. Thesis, 2012 
Supervisor: Ayhan Akman   
 
Keywords: republican patriotism, Maurizio Viroli, republicanism, Jürgen Habermas, 
constitutional patriotism 
 
This study aims to explore Viroli‟s republican patriotism and Habermas‟s constitutional 
patriotism by starting off from the fundamental question what makes constitutional 
patriotism different from republican patriotism. The main motivation of such an 
examination comes from Viroli‟s argument that Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism is 
a version of republican patriotism. Against Viroli‟s claim, the main argument of this 
thesis is that Habermas‟s theory of constitutional patriotism cannot be incorporated and 
assimilated into a form of republican patriotism. Firstly, republican patriotism, the one 
constructed by Viroli, is highly based on the republicanism of Machiavelli and 
Rousseau, while Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism draws mostly from Kant and 
Hegel. The second point explored is the distinction between republican patriotism which 
aims to bring back pre-national form of attachment, and constitutional patriotism that 
represents the search for post-national allegiances. The next emphasis is on the 
republican patriotism of Viroli that suggests rhetoric to reach citizens‟ hearts to instill 
love and passion for a country and pride for its history. Habermas, on the other hand, 
tries to apply his “communicative reason” and “discourse ethics” to construct a 
rationally oriented post-conventional community organized under the umbrella of 
constitutional patriotism in which citizens publicly confront their traumatic past. 
Finally, whereas Viroli‟s republican patriotism can be considered as an answer given 
from the republican tradition to the question of how to overcome national identity, 
Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism can be read as a critique of this tradition although 
he does not completely isolates himself from republicanism. Hence, recognizing the 
similarities and overlaps between these concepts, the main purpose of this paper is to 
point out in what respects constitutional patriotism is distinguished from republican 
patriotism.   
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ÖZET 
HABERMAS VE VĠROLĠ ANAYASA VE YURT ÜZERĠNE: ANAYASAL 
YURTSEVERLĠĞĠN BĠR SAVUNMASI 
 
ERDĠNÇ ERDEM 
Siyaset Bilimi, M.A. Tezi, 2012 
Danışman: Ayhan Akman   
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlik, Maurizio Viroli, cumhuriyetçilik, 
Jürgen Habermas, anayasal yurtseverlik 
 
Bu çalışma anayasal yurtseverliği cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlikten farklı kılan nedir temel 
sorusundan yola çıkarak Viroli‟nin cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlik ve Habermas‟ın anayasal 
yurtseverlik kavramlarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Viroli‟nin savunduğu, 
Habermas‟ın anayasal yurtseverliğinin, cumhuriyetçi yurtseverliğin bir biçimi olduğu 
iddiası bu tezin ana motivasyonunu teşkil eder. Viroli‟nin iddiasına karşı bu tezin temel 
argümanı Habermas‟ın anayasal yurtseverlik teorisinin cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlik 
içerisine dahil edilemeyeceği ve bu kavram altında düşünülemeyeceğidir. Öncelikle, 
Viroli‟nin inşa ettiği haliyle cumhuriyetçi yurtseverliğin başlıca dayanakları Machiavelli 
ve Rousseau iken, Habermas‟ın anayasal yurtseverliği, kaynağını bilhassa Kant‟tan ve 
Hegel‟den alır. Ġkinci olarak, cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlik bir tür ulus-öncesi [pre-
national] bağlanmayı geri getirmeyi amaçlarken, anayasal yurtseverlik ulus-ötesi [post-
national] aidiyetlerin arayışının bir temsilcisidir. Değinilecek bir diğer önemli nokta ise, 
Viroli‟nin cumhuriyetçi yurtseverliğinin retorik yoluyla yurttaşların kalbine ulaşarak, 
onlara ülkelerine karşı sevgi ve tutku beslemelerini ve tarihleriyle gurur duymalarını 
önermesi, ve buna karşılık Habermas‟ın, “iletişimsel akıl” ve “söylem etiği” teorilerini 
uygulayarak, anayasal yurtseverlik şemsiyesi altında kendi travmatik tarihiyle kamusal 
olarak yüzleşebilen yurttaşlardan oluşmuş rasyonel bir gelenek-sonrası toplum [post-
conventional community] inşa etmesidir. Son olarak, Viroli‟nin cumhuriyetçi 
yurtseverliğini ulusal kimliği nasıl aşabiliriz sorusuna cumhuriyetçi gelenek içerisinden 
verilen bir yanıt olarak düşünebilirken, Habermas‟ın anayasal yurtseverliğini, Habermas 
kendisini bu gelenekten tamamen soyutlamasa da, cumhuriyetçiliğin bir tür eleştirisi 
olarak okuyabiliriz. Dolayısıyla, kavramlar arasındaki benzerliklerin ve örtüşmelerin 
farkında olarak, bu çalışmanın asıl amacı, anayasal yurtseverliğin hangi açılardan 
cumhuriyetçi yurtseverlikten ayrılabileceğini ortaya koymaktır. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is an analysis of two different conceptions of patriotism: 1) 
republican patriotism, and 2) constitutional patriotism. The main motivation of this 
thesis comes from Viroli‟s argument that Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism is a 
version of republican patriotism.
1
 As a scholar “loosely affiliated”2 with the Cambridge 
School, Viroli draws from a method of contextualism developed by the historians of this 
school, such as Pocock and Skinner, and reconceptualizes republican patriotism by 
studying the political philosophy of Machiavelli and Rousseau. By equating love of 
patria with love of liberty, he argues that this kind of patriotism can be presented as an 
antidote to nationalism.
3
 For Viroli, republican patriotism and nationalism use different 
languages but the same method, which is rhetoric, instead of purely rational arguments. 
Therefore, he rhetorically suggests that people should not be “good Italians” or “good 
Germans;” rather, “they should become Italian or German citizens.”4 Hence, he not only 
thinks that patriotism is an antidote to nationalism, it is also an alternative for 
nationalism.  
                                                     
1
 Viroli, Maurizio (1995). For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and 
Nationalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 171.  
 
2
 McCormick, John P. (2003). Machiavelli against Republicanism: On the Cambridge 
School‟s „Guicciardinian Moments‟. Political Theory, 31(5), p. 615. 
 
3
 Although the purpose of this paper is not to discuss how Viroli‟s patriotism is 
distinguished from nationalism, it is still necessary to point out the way Viroli perceives 
and conceptualizes nationalism. In For Love of Country, he describes nation as oneness, 
a cultural unity grounded upon history, language, literature, religion, art, and science 
that all together form “the people” as a single body with a particular soul, faculties, and 
forces. Drawing on Herder and Fichte, nationalism for Viroli is “love of our national 
culture,” which is considered as natural and spiritual. See: Viroli, Maurizio (1995). For 
Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism, pp. 118-122. For a 
discussion between Viroli and his critiques on ethnic and civic dimensions of 
nationalism, see: Viroli, Maurizio (1998a). On civic republicanism: Reply to Xenos and 
Yack. Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 12(1-2), pp. 187-196.  
 
4
 Viroli, Maurizio (1995). For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and 
Nationalism, p. 9.  
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Viroli‟s arguments raise some critiques that what he is presenting is actually a 
version of civic nationalism.
5
 In other words, his critiques assert that republican 
patriotism is not different from nationalism. Viroli counters such critiques by suggesting 
that republican patriotism is not only different from but also against nationalism. He 
thinks that those critiques are mistaken due to “the lack of a historically accurate 
distinction between patriotism and nationalism.”6 Hence, by placing patriotism into a 
historical context, he tries to recover and reinstate the pre-national republican form of 
patriotism to surpass the discourses of nationalism. Apart from his own scholarly 
wrestle with nationalism, he also presents some other thinkers differentiating patriotism 
from nationalism. According to him, Habermas is one of those who seek to put barriers 
between patriotism and nationalism by introducing a theory of constitutional patriotism.  
This thesis takes up Viroli‟s discussion on republican and constitutional 
patriotism. Instead of affirming Viroli on this point, the main purpose of this thesis is to 
counter his argument, which places constitutional patriotism under republican 
patriotism. To this end, referring to Viroli, in this thesis, I argue that Habermas‟s 
constitutional patriotism cannot be incorporated into Viroli‟s version of republican 
patriotism. To prove this argument, I will lead a discussion with a simple question in 
mind: what makes constitutional patriotism different from republican patriotism? With 
this question, I also aim to change the focus of scholars who study constitutional and 
republican patriotisms together with nationalism; and put a question mark in the minds 
of those who think that these two different patriotisms share the same grounds with only 
slight differences.       
Patriotism, namely love of country and a special concern for its fellow members, 
is a modern concept the meaning of which, however, has a very long tradition. The 
origin of the concept comes from a Latin word, patria or terra patria, the land of the 
fathers. In the Roman Republic, patria was the sacred city of people with its particular 
                                                     
5
 Xenos, Nicholas (1998). Questioning Patriotism: Rejoinder to Viroli. Critical Review: 
A Journal of Politics and Society, 12 (1-2), pp. 197 – 201; Yack, Bernard (1998). Can 
Patriotism Save Us From Nationalism? Rejoinder to Viroli. Critical Review: A Journal 
of Politics and Society, 12(1-2), pp. 203 – 206.  
6
 Viroli, Maurizio (1995). For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and 
Nationalism, p. 5. 
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culture, tradition, religion, and faith.
7
 As Arendt suggests, the meaning of patria, as a 
city that symbolizes moral, religious, ethical, and political values, largely developed in 
Rome.
8
 Since patria was much more than a piece of land but a land of an ethical 
community, it was also the place where individuals developed their identities as well as 
the community identity through the land in which they lived. As a city, patria had its 
own God and a particular system of morality. In order to show loyalty and devotion to 
their God and its land, people made rituals, ceremonies, and sacrifices. We can see this 
in the words of Cicero: “What good citizen would hesitate to welcome death if it were 
profitable to patria?”9 Besides its sacred aspect, it had a political meaning in the name 
of res publica. Res publica, which means public things or things in common, was the 
political organization of Rome in which citizens were required to actively engage in the 
administration of their city-state.  
After the expansion of the Roman Empire and due to the transformative 
influence of Christianity, the secular-political meaning of patria was replaced with a 
more religious-philosophical understanding, which emphasized the universe and 
humanity as the locus of love and loyalty, rather than a particular worldly territory.
10
 
For this purpose, Christian philosophy came up with a bond between people, which is 
strong enough to replace the world; and they proposed “brotherhood” of all humanity 
ruled by the principle of charity.
11
 Hence, instead of treating people as equal citizens of 
the republic, Christianity taught them to be brothers of the same family.
12
  
Starting from the late Middle Ages and throughout the Renaissance, political 
significance of patria reappeared in the writings of historians and philosophers. Either 
                                                     
7
 In the ancient Greece, however, this word, patriotai, referred to barbarians/foreigners 
instead of citizens. See: Dietz, Mary G. (1989). Patriotism. In T. Ball, J. Farr, and R.L. 
Hanson (eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 178. 
 
8
 Arendt, Hannah (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
p. 120.  
 
9
 Dietz, Mary G. (1989). Patriotism, p. 178; Kantorowicz, Ernst (1957). The King’s Two 
Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Thought. NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 242.  
10
 Dietz, Mary G. (1989). Patriotism, p. 179. 
 
11
 Arendt, Hannah (1958). The Human Condition, pp. 53-54.  
 
12
 Ibid. 
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against the arbitrary power of the Church and the despotic rulers, or corruption, these 
thinkers sought to recover the old meaning of citizenship to provide justice, stability, 
and order in the society and state. Moreover, since the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, Italian city-states had already established republics with a link to the ancient 
republican experience. And these societies of the early modern period started to 
problematize traditional religious legitimation. Thus, Machiavelli conceptualized his 
republicanism and patriotism with an emphasis on active and virtuous citizenship in the 
service of patria. In order to suggest a better organized republic, he underlined the 
secular meaning of patria in terms of laws and institutions that citizens should work to 
build and maintain.
13
 Therefore, his writings on republicanism, especially in The 
Discourses, rendered him one of the key figures in the republican tradition. 
The movement that Machiavelli started in the fifteenth century in Florence easily 
circulated around Europe, from Italy to England and Dutch Republic, then, France and 
finally to the American continent. Many thinkers, such as Harrington, Montesquieu, and 
Tocqueville, were influenced by his republicanism. However, it was Rousseau, who 
made a major innovation to Machiavelli‟s republicanism and idea of citizenship. 
Rousseau introduced the principle of popular sovereignty, that is, the idea that citizens 
will be their own masters by obeying the rules and laws that they deliberatively create. 
Moreover, while Machiavelli was emphasizing the instrumental benefit of the pursuit of 
the common good, that citizens can meet their interests only if they serve for the well-
being of the republic, Rousseau brought up the concept of general will as the will above 
all private wills. In this respect, in Rousseau‟s republic, there is no difference between 
“good man” and “good citizen” because good man is a man in the state of nature, which 
does not exist anymore; but good citizen is a citizen that successfully adopts moral and 
ethical values of the community s/he lives.  
Especially after the French Revolution, due to the rise of nation-states with 
capitalist market structures, republican tradition lost its prominence against liberal 
political philosophy. Similarly, patriotic discourses of republicanism converged with 
nationalist discourses. Therefore, until the second half of the twentieth century, 
republicanism and patriotism were largely neglected by scholars of political philosophy. 
                                                     
13
 Habermas, Jürgen (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 137.  
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However, because liberalism failed to find a cure for the pathologies of the twentieth 
century, some historians from the Cambridge School applied their contextualist method 
to the early modern thinkers of republicanism in order to come up with a new definition 
of freedom. Among them, Pettit introduced his conception of liberty, which is “liberty 
as non-domination.”14  
Following the Cambridge School and its contextualism, and based on the 
definition of liberty introduced by Pettit, Viroli suggests that patriotism of the early 
modern republics signified love of liberty. In order to justify his argument, he 
reexamines the texts of Machiavelli and Rousseau. Viroli believes that if we return to 
the pre-national attachments, and if we use a rhetoric that revitalizes this old 
understanding of patriotism, we can both overcome nationalism, and create an inclusive 
and peaceful society. Therefore, Viroli‟s patriotism is presented as an alternative to 
nationalism. He also believes that patriotism and nationalism are completely different 
attachments. In this respect, in order to reinforce his argument, he brings up Habermas‟s 
constitutional patriotism as an example of republican patriotism.  
In this thesis, I aim to reveal that Viroli‟s patriotism and Habermas‟s 
constitutional patriotism are different forms of allegiances. Viroli‟s attempt to assimilate 
constitutional patriotism into republican patriotism is due to his shallow reading of 
Habermas‟s political theory. Therefore, with a careful analysis of Habermas‟s 
constitutional patriotism, I will set down in what respects it diverges from republican 
patriotism drawn by Viroli. Looking through Viroli‟s republican patriotism and 
Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism, in this thesis, I address four differences. First of 
all, as opposed to Viroli‟s yearning for pre-national attachments other than national 
citizenship, Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism is based on a post-national citizenship. 
Habermas does not only introduce constitutional patriotism to erase nationalism and 
bring a new allegiance; but he also thinks that due to globalization and mass movements 
in the world, nationalism has already become impotent for creating socialization and 
solidarity in multicultural societies.
15
 Therefore, he points out that regardless of 
diversity of cultures in societies, they need another form of allegiance to socialize into a 
                                                     
14
 Pettit, Philip (1998). Cumhuriyetçilik: Bir Özgürlük ve Yönetim Teorisi. Ġstanbul: 
Ayrıntı Yayınları.  
15
 Habermas, Jürgen (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy, p. 508.  
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common political culture.
16
 However, what kind of allegiance is it, if it is not pre-
national republican patriotism? And here lies another fundamental difference between 
their perspectives.  
Second, although Viroli defines love of patria as love of liberty, he still ties his 
patriotism to particularities, such as common culture, common ethnicity, and common 
history. In this respect, he criticizes Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism. He claims 
that constitutional patriotism of Habermas requires bonds of citizenship through 
“identification with values that are part of the particular culture of a people.”17 In other 
words, tying citizenship to formal-legal concept of constitution cannot be adequate to 
stimulate civic solidarity.
18
 Therefore, in a way, he talks about patriotism for a 
“concrete” historical community, such as “Italians,” “Germans,” and “Turks.” He comes 
up with patriotism for an already-constructed conventional community.  
However, instead of attaching ourselves to pre-political values, such as family, 
ethnos, and/or nation, which are imagined to exist prior to opinion and will-formation of 
citizens, Habermas suggests a post-conventional collective identity, which is “an 
identification with the norms and procedures that constitute the idealized „unlimited 
communication community.‟”19 Drawing on Kohlberg and Mead, he argues that post-
conventional ego identity of individuals enable them to free themselves from their 
traditional attachments. If a mature individual is able to overcome her conventional 
identity, Habermas believes that mature politics can also uncouple itself from pre-
political grounds.
20
   
The third difference between Viroli and Habermas is concerned with the bases 
that they construct republican and constitutional patriotism. Viroli‟s patriotism is a 
rhetoric that targets citizens‟ emotions with an emphasis on their common history. In 
                                                     
16
 Ibid., p. 500.  
 
17
 Viroli, Maurizio (1995). For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and 
Nationalism, p. 174. 
 
18
 Ibid., p. 175.  
 
19
 Markell, Patchen (2000). Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: On “Constitutional 
Patriotism.” Political Theory, 28(1), p. 42.   
 
20
 Ibid., p. 43. 
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this respect, he thinks that Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism is built upon Germans‟ 
particular pride for having been able to construct democratic institutions that could 
successfully dismiss Nazism after the Second World War.
21
 However, Habermas‟s 
constitutional patriotism is supposed to be based on reason. Constitutional patriotism is 
not a sentiment that people should rhetorically be convinced to feel for their country, 
but a result of “communicative reason.” Therefore, while individuals establish solidarity 
among each other in a society, they also develop a disposition for self-criticism about 
their past.
22
  
Finally, I will focus on in what sense constitutional patriotism can be against 
republican patriotism. Here, I will examine Habermas‟s critiques of republicanism. As 
opposed to Viroli, Habermas does not think that republicanism lost its influence with 
the rise of nationalism; on the contrary, he argues that the former became a path for the 
latter: “National consciousness and republican conviction in a sense proved themselves 
in the willingness to fight and die for one‟s country. This explains the complementary 
relation that originally obtained between nationalism and republicanism: one became 
the vehicle for the emergence of the other.”23 But it by no means implies that Habermas 
totally rejects the republican tradition; republicanism constitutes one side of his “co-
originality” thesis, which is, as I will explore, the core of his constitutional patriotism.  
I shall divide my analysis into two main chapters. In the first chapter, I will first 
explore republican patriotism. To this end, I will start with Machiavelli to establish the 
grounds of patriotism that will continue up to Rousseau. Then, I will continue with 
Rousseau‟s republicanism and patriotism. Finally, I will discuss the revitalization of 
republican patriotism through the works of the Cambridge School and Viroli. In this 
part, I will explore how Viroli comes to the conclusion, out of Machiavelli and 
Rousseau, that republican patriotism signifies love of liberty. However, I will leave my 
                                                     
21
 Viroli, Maurizio (1995). For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and 
Nationalism, p. 172. 
 
22
 Müller, J. Werner (2009). Seven Ways to Misunderstand Constitutional Patriotism. 
Notizie di POLITEIA, 25(96), p. 23.  
23
 Habermas, Jürgen (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy, p. 495.  
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critiques on Viroli to the last chapter, where I compare his republican patriotism with 
Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism.  
In the second chapter, I will turn to constitutional patriotism. In this chapter, I 
emphasize how constitutional patriotism comes to imply engaging in a rational relation 
with the laws and institutions of a political society. Here, I will first look at how 
constitutional patriotism as a concept was introduced in political philosophy. This kind 
of patriotism can be found in one of the most significant, but in our context often 
neglected, philosophers of the early nineteenth century, Hegel. I will examine Hegel‟s 
Philosophy of Right, particularly the part on “Constitutional Law,” where he most 
elaborately expresses and defines patriotism as “political disposition” based on truth 
and a habitual volition, which can only be realized through the rationality that citizens 
habitually know that “the community is the substantial basis and end.”24 Since he ties 
political disposition to truth, he suggests that patriotism must address a concrete 
institution, which has actuality, for disposition. Hence, for Hegel, it must be the 
constitution where citizens give allegiance.  
Nevertheless, since Hegel has a political philosophy which requires more space 
than this thesis, I will limit my discussion on how Hegel‟s political philosophy had an 
influence on Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism. In this sense, I will underline two 
points. The first one is that Hegel suggests that justice and solidarity can be possible if 
individuals rationally identify themselves with the state in the ethical life [sittlichkeit]. 
This is one of the things that Habermas later takes up to form his “discourse ethics,” 
which is a rule for argumentation in the public sphere, and which is supposed to bring 
about both justice and solidarity. Second, unlike Machiavelli and Rousseau, Hegel 
constructs his patriotism on the basis of consciousness: “the highest consciousness of 
freedom is the consciousness of this membership,” that he calls “political disposition” 
or “patriotism.”25 His patriotism does not require metaphysics or religion. Similarly, it 
                                                     
24
 Hegel, Georg W. F. (1995). Elements of the Philosophy of Right. In G. W. F. Hegel, 
A. F. Wood, and B. H. Nisbet (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 288-
289.   
 
25
 Wood, Allen (1995). Editor‟s Introduction. In G. W. F. Hegel, A. W. Wood, and H. 
B. Nisbet (eds.), Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. xxv.  
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does not require extraordinary sacrifices for the patria; for him, patriotism is an 
everyday activity, it is a volition and habituation. Moreover, his patriotism is not 
towards an abstract entity; he obviously asserts that citizens should give allegiance to 
the state as the abstract actuality but more concretely, political disposition should be 
towards the political constitution, “which proceeds perpetually from the state, just as it 
is the means by which the state preserves itself.”26   
After Hegel, I will dwell on the contemporary debates on constitutional 
patriotism, starting from the constitutional debates in Germany. Finally, I will examine 
Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism in comparison with Viroli‟s republican patriotism. 
In this part, I will present a republican patriotism in line with Machiavelli and Rousseau 
versus a constitutional patriotism which relies on the political philosophy of Hegel and 
Kant. Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism is not only influenced by Hegel, but also it is 
a critique of him. Unlike Hegel, who argues that the state is the Universal Idea, “an 
absolute and unmoved end in itself,”27 Habermas reinstates Kantian project of 
cosmopolitanism that establishes an ethical life beyond nation-states through his 
constitutional patriotism. Therefore, for Habermas, constitutional patriotism is not just 
another theory of nation-states; societies constructed on the basis of constitutional 
citizenship and a liberal political culture is a key towards world citizenship.   
Finally I would like to remark that the order of chapters and general outline of 
the thesis have a logic. In the first part, I start with examining republican patriotisms of 
Machiavelli and Rousseau. By doing this, I aim to provide a short genealogy of 
republican patriotism via two of the most important figures on this matter. In 
Machiavelli and Rousseau, we can easily see the flow and patterns of the tradition of 
republican patriotism. Besides this, these two figures have a direct impact on Viroli‟s 
conceptualization of republican patriotism. Hence, the first part will be a presentation of 
a republican patriotism deriving from Machiavelli and Rousseau. In the second part, I 
explore another conceptualization of patriotism which is in line with Hegel and Kant, 
and is formulated by Habermas. In so doing, I will reveal the contrasts between Viroli‟s 
republican patriotism and Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism.    
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CHAPTER 2: ON REPUBLICAN PATRIOTISM 
 
I. Machiavelli: A Republican Citizen or the Author of The Prince? 
“When evening comes, I return home and enter my study… I enter the ancient 
courts of men of old, in which I am received affectionately by them and partake 
of the food that properly belongs to me, and for which I was born. There I do not 
hesitate to converse with them, and ask them why they acted as they did; and out 
of kindness they respond… I have written down what has been valuable in their 
conversations, and have composed a little book On Principalities…”28   
This is a part of the famous latter to Francesco Vettori, a Florentine diplomat, 
from Machiavelli, who was a sixteenth century Florentine citizen, one of the most 
influential and controversial Renaissance humanists, and a political thinker of 
republicanism. He served to the Florentine republic as a public servant and diplomat 
between 1498 and 1512.
29
 During his service, he was sent to many places for diplomatic 
purposes, contacted with various political leaders whom he later examined in his books, 
such as Louis VII of France, Cesare Borgia, Pope Julius II and the Emperor 
Maximilian.
30
 His missions for the Republic of Florence enabled him to formulate his 
political ideas based on the events of his time. However, as the quotation from his letter 
to Vettori shows, while explaining the political phenomena of his time, he was mostly 
influenced by the philosophers of the ancients that he goes by jumping over the 
medieval philosophy. He transcends the Christian tradition of natural law of St. Thomas 
Aquinas and reaches to Aristotle‟s Politics, Cicero‟s Republic, Greek historian 
Polybius, and Livy‟s History of Rome.31   
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It is very certain that Machiavelli breaks with the medieval thought which was 
immensely fuelled with Christian doctrines. Instead, he turns to the ancients, and studies 
their political life and philosophy. Particularly, as Crick suggests, “He is best 
understood if one starts with Aristotle” rather than other ancient philosophers.32 It 
means that instead of dwelling on the ideal or imagined political life, his motives in 
writing his books are mostly driven by the events of his lifetime or his empirical 
observations. This point is very clear in his own words: “But because I want to write 
what will be useful to anyone who understands it, it seems to me better to concentrate 
on what really happens rather than on theories or speculations. For many have imagined 
republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist.”33 In what 
follows, he argues that the way people live is different from how they ought to live.
34
 
His approach certainly addresses the empirical world to explain politics. Hence, albeit 
reproachable, many of his interpreters, especially the theorists of international relations, 
consider him as a classical realist thinker.
35
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mentioned above. As Cochrane earlier puts it, “Every generation since the time of 
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1960. The Journal of Modern History, 33(2), p. 113. Similarly, Berlin states that apart 
from dozens of scholars (re)interpreting Machiavelli, there is now a growing literature 
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12 
 
One of the most significant debates on “different Machiavellis” arises out of his 
two books: The Prince and The Discourses. For many of his readers, Machiavelli is 
generally known only as the author of The Prince or as a thinker who advices princes 
and kings on how to maintain power over the territories they rule. However, readers of 
his other works, especially The Discourses (Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio), 
also view him as a thinker who regenerates the ancient Roman republicanism for the 
modern era. Therefore, his only influential book was not The Prince, but The 
Discourses can also be considered just as significant. However, reading The Prince and 
The Discourses, one comes up with two different views, and thus develops two different 
interpretations of Machiavelli. This duality of interpretations is thought to arise due to 
these two different works in which whereas he brings back the republican stance based 
on Roman sources in The Discourses; he draws up ways to establish a sort of absolutist 
rule in The Prince.
36
 In that respect, while for some, he has been the “teacher of evil”37 
for he emphasizes that “a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to 
act immorally when this becomes necessary,”38 some others, including me, consider him 
as a thinker who stands “beyond good and evil.” Between these two readings of 
Machiavelli, which gives us “the best Machiavelli” is still a discussion topic. However 
still, either Machiavelli was the founder of modern republican thought or he is only the 
advisor of rulers is not yet a settled dispute that continues in our time. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that Hans Baron describes him both as “the republican citizen” and “the 
author of The Prince.”39  
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In this thesis, rather than examining Machiavelli‟s alleged formulation of 
absolute authority,
40
 and dualities of his various interpretations, I will dwell on how 
Machiavelli attains his name as a neo-Roman thinker.
41
 In other words, I will explore 
Machiavelli‟s theory of republicanism in which he studies the complex ties and 
relationships between individual character, political life, and institutions.
42
 To this end, I 
underline two important points that Machiavelli addresses. Firstly and heavily based on 
contemporary interpretations of Machiavelli, I examine his republicanism as the 
building and protection of free way of life pursued by internally and externally non-
dominated citizens. Secondly, I discuss Machiavelli‟s republic as a secular patria, 
sacredness of which is notably diminished compared to his medieval republican 
predecessors. 
I.I. The Prince and Machiavelli’s Understanding of Republic [Repubblica] 
Machiavelli‟s The Prince starts with a sentence “All the states, all the dominions 
that have held sway over men, have been either republics or principalities”43 After that, 
                                                     
40
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the rest of his book mostly analyzes various forms of principalities; and how a prudent 
leader should deal with situations that he faces, through his virtue [virtù]. The other 
things that he also discusses are the composition of military, and the role of fortune 
[fortuna] and necessities [necessità] in shaping humans‟ lives. In this sense, The Prince 
does not seem to have much to say about Machiavelli‟s republicanism. However, for the 
purposes of this paper, at least two important points can be derived from this book: 1) 
what he means by the term “republic,” and 2) his emphasis on human reason both as a 
ruler and a citizen. Hence, it is important to examine The Prince first, and look for the 
consistencies in his philosophy, before dwelling on his republicanism and patriotism in 
The Discourses. Unlike what some scholars argue, reading The Prince merely as advises 
to princes is nothing but interpreting the book with a subversive manner.
44
 In this 
respect, I follow Viroli‟s analytical distinction of the two books: he suggests that The 
Prince is a theory of state, which is about effective and efficient rule, whereas The 
Discourses is a theory of the political [vivere politico], which is a task that belongs to 
free citizens of a republic.
45
  
In the chapter V of The Prince, where he describes how to rule cities that used to 
live under their own laws, and in the chapter IX, where he discusses the civil 
principalities, he uses republics interchangeably with “free way of life,”46 “governing 
themselves,”47 and liberty [libertà].48 According to this usage of the term, he seems to 
have “life in liberty” in his mind when he talks about republics. For him, republic is a 
state whose rules and institutions are constituted by its citizens. In other words, citizens 
enjoy their freedom [vivere liberi] by actively engaging in the construction and 
maintenance of their free state. Yet this understanding of republic as vivere liberi is not 
Machiavelli‟s own conceptualization. According to Rubinstein, this conceptualization of 
republic has its roots in the thirteenth and fourteenth century Italian city republics, 
where it acquired the opposite meaning of despotic rule: “the fundamental antithesis 
between despotic rule and the „populi che vivono in libertà‟, the „libertas populi‟, a term 
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which, in the fifteenth century, the humanists replaced with the classical one for the 
commonwealth, res publica.
49
 However, since Machiavelli does not talk much about 
republics in The Prince, one can get only what he means by the term “republic.” As 
Machiavelli himself points out, he discusses republics not in The Prince but his other 
work, The Discourses: “I shall not discuss republics, because I have previously treated 
them at length.”50 
Another important contribution of The Prince to our study is Machiavelli‟s 
emphasis on human reason in shaping our lives. In the chapter XXV of the book, 
Machiavelli discusses and undermines the power of fortune on human affairs, where he 
also mentions about the power of God: “I am not unaware that many have thought, and 
many still think, that the affairs of the world are so ruled by fortune and by God that the 
ability of men cannot control them. Rather, they think that we have no remedy at all; 
and therefore it could be concluded that it is useless to sweat much over things, but let 
them be governed by fate.”51 It is quite clear from this passage that he questions this 
viewpoint. In the following sentences, in order to justify his argument, he makes some 
comparisons. One of them is the comparison between fortune and dangerous rivers. He 
explains that when rivers flood the plains and cause destructions, the guilty is not bad 
fortune but people themselves who did not take precautions.
52
 Therefore, such a natural 
event does not cause harm to people because of fortune or God‟s will; it turns out to be 
harmful only because humans fail to take measures in case of such natural disasters.  
Furthermore, in the chapter XXIV of the book, he makes another comparison, 
and this time, he compares fortune with the prudence of a leader. He argues that when a 
leader loses its power and his principality after having ruled it for a long time, he should 
not put the blame on his bad luck but his indolence because of which he fails to observe, 
in quiet times, that things could change.
53
 He, therefore, believes that if a ruler loses his 
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territory, it is not related to his bad luck or the wishes of God but his lack of virtue. 
Likewise, if he successfully acquires a territory and establishes his authority over the 
inhabitants of those lands, nothing but only his prudence and virtue is credited. In these 
two examples, Machiavelli attributes human reason a central position in worldly affairs. 
He explains that our fortune or God do not rule our lives; whether we achieve our 
purposes or not does not completely depend on these things but they are under the 
control of human beings: “I am disposed to hold that fortune is the arbiter of half of our 
actions, but that it lets us control roughly the other half.”54 Moreover, he argues that the 
power of fortune declines or rises according to the amount of virtue that a country has.
55
 
Therefore, Machiavelli asserts that worldly affairs are not under the control of fortune or 
God alone but humans, as long as they act in a virtuous or prudent way.
56
  
Thus, although The Prince exclusively focuses on the principalities rather than 
republics, as I have tried to show in the above paragraphs, we can trace certain 
conclusions on his conceptualization of republics and citizenship. He gives us clues 
about how he considers republics. He uses the term “republic” interchangeably with free 
way of life or people who live under their own laws and institutions. He also attributes 
men an active position in terms of their worldly affairs. However, this part will be more 
clarified in his other book, The Discourses, which I will examine now.  
I.II. The Discourses and Political Life [vivere politico] 
Based on biographical evidence, Crick suggests that Machiavelli was working 
on The Prince and The Discourses at the same time.
57
 He wrote The Prince in 1513, 
when a part of The Discourses either had already been written or was planned. In 1516, 
he revised The Prince, while he was still working on The Discourses; and in 1519, he 
paused writing them in order to start writing the Art of War, and then, he wrote the 
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Florentine History.
58
 Contrary to The Prince, Machiavelli talks entirely about republics 
in The Discourses. Through a historical and comparative perspective, he examines some 
of the ancient republics, such as Rome, Sparta, and Venice. On the other hand, he writes 
about these republics only to compare them with the Republic of Rome, of which he 
presents us a detailed analysis. Hence, this book is the one where Machiavelli‟s idea of 
republics is crystallized.  
However, it should also be noted that Machiavelli deviates from the common 
understanding that uses republics as the antidote of monarchies or one-person rule. His 
conceptualization of republic allows for a single-ruler as well. In The Discourses he 
argues that there are six types of government, three of which are good in nature but can 
easily become bad, and the rest are bad in nature: 1) principality, which can easily turn 
into tyranny, 2) aristocracy, which can lead to oligarchy, and 3) democracy, which can 
convert to anarchy.
59
 Among them, principality, aristocracy, and democracy are good 
forms of governments; but they are not satisfactory because their lives are too short. 
They are also the forms that every newly established state must adopt according to 
which serves best for their interests (ibid.). On the other hand, tyranny, oligarchy, and 
anarchy are inherently malignant.
60
  
For Machiavelli, republic is certainly not a type of government; his 
conceptualization of republic is not related to governing or ruling. Therefore, 
maintaining Viroli‟s analytical distinction, it can be stated that while governing or 
ruling as a shrewd leader, which Machiavelli describes in The Prince, is his art or theory 
of state; republic is where citizens enjoy their political lives, and where Machiavelli‟s 
art of politics finds its true meaning. For Viroli, “state” and “politics” have opposite 
meanings that can best be observed in the language that Machiavelli uses in The Prince 
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and The Discourses.
61
 He points out that the term “politico” or any of its equivalents is 
not found in The Prince.
62
 He remarks that vivere politico is a “specific form of political 
organization which precludes tyranny and despotic rule and is incompatible with the 
state of somebody: if a citizen or a party succeeds in dominating over the laws and the 
magistrates, one can no longer speak of republic.”63 However, political organization of 
any form, including republics, is considered as states. It can be seen in The Prince, 
where Machiavelli describes the Turkish Kingdom (lo stato del Turco) as a despotic 
state, “kingdoms ruled like France” (lo stato di Francia) as a moderate kingdom, and 
“states…accustomed to living under their own laws and in freedom” as republics.64  
There is no evidence of the term “politics” or a similar word in The Prince 
simply because, in this book, Machiavelli was not talking about the political life, but the 
art of the state, “the art of preserving and reinforcing the state of the prince.”65 On the 
contrary, vivere politico is the art of establishing and preserving necessary institutions 
for and by the free citizens of a free republic. The use of the word politico was confined 
to the sphere of the city; perpetuating the conventional meaning of politics, in 
Machiavelli‟s language, it means the art of the city.66 In this respect, his reference point 
is mostly the ancient Republic of Rome. In the beginning of The Discourses, he makes 
derivations out of the Roman experience: “Those who read of the origin of the city of 
Rome, of its legislators and of its constitution, will not be surprised that in this city such 
great virtue was maintained for so many centuries, and that later on there came into 
being the empire into which that republic developed.”67 Then, he comes to the 
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conclusion that all cities are established either by native inhabitants or foreigners.
68
 And 
in either case, these cities are founded as free cities in the beginning.
69
 By free city, he 
simply means that they are not dependent on other cities or states but it is rather a place 
of collective self-dependence. In order to maintain their freedom, these cities should 
also be established in fertile places, and fertility of those places should be kept in 
bounds by laws.
70
  
On the other hand, defining “free citizen” is not that straightforward in 
Machiavelli. His understanding of “free citizen” is not a person who is able to act 
according to his own choices. A free citizen is certainly someone who is not dependent 
on others,
71
 but Machiavelli does not think that freedom of choice concerning the 
political life is a good idea; he argues that between work by necessity and work by 
choice, there is greater virtue where work out of necessity prevails because choice may 
cause discord and idleness among citizens while they need to be united.
72
 His 
pessimistic view on human nature makes him think that “men never do good unless 
necessity derives them to it.”73 He asserts that when people are too free to choose and 
free to act according to their choices, this creates only confusion and disorder.
74
 Hence, 
necessity renders people industrious; and laws out of necessity make them good since 
legislation is not required only because there is something wrong in the society, and it is 
necessary to fix the problem.
75
  
Therefore, free citizenship for Machiavelli is rather active citizenship, that 
citizens take part in building the laws and other institutions of a state. Their freedom 
enables them to create new institutions or laws when it is necessary. In this respect, 
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Machiavelli gives an example from history of the Roman Republic. He states that the 
establishment of tribunes of plebs was the outcome of such a necessity. He points out 
that through the establishment of the tribunes of the plebs, Roman Republic reached its 
perfection especially when the tribunes of the plebs started to be appointed as an 
opposition to the senate.
76
 Plebs had needed to raise their voices to the ruling elites in 
the republic. To this end, and out of a big struggle, they established their tribunes 
against the senate. In this way, they gained a right to have a say in the legislation. From 
then on, all legislation was made after long discussions and quarrels between the plebs 
and the senate. This historical event seems to fascinate Machiavelli so much that he 
comes to the following conclusion: he argues that, unlike the discord among citizens, 
discord between the plebs and senate made the Roman Republic free and powerful; that 
is, the clash between the populace and the upper class brought about legislations 
favoring liberty and thus good laws.
77
  
This clash can be summarized as a tension between those who desire to 
dominate, and who do not want to be dominated, as described by Machiavelli.
78
  On the 
one hand, those who desire to dominate come from the upper class, the senate, and thus, 
they are the “haves.” They hold power to govern in their hands and they do not want to 
lose it. On the other hand, those who resist being dominated come from the lower class, 
the plebs; they are the “have-nots.” They have nothing but their liberty, and they want to 
maintain their freedom. Out of this conflict, against the critiques of this clash, 
Machiavelli argues that Rome made laws for the common good; and it was only through 
this way that they created and maintained their liberty: “To me those who condemn the 
quarrels between the nobles and the plebs, seem to be caviling at the very things that 
were the primary cause of Rome‟s retaining her freedom…nor do they realize that in 
every republic there are two different dispositions, that of the populace and that of the 
upper class and that all legislation favorable to liberty is brought about by the clash 
between them.”79  
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The idea of discord or tumults is normally something alien to the classical 
republican thought. In this sense, while Machiavelli was deeply inspired by his ancient 
predecessors, especially by Cicero, he brings an original contribution to republicanism. 
Indeed, beyond being a contribution, Machiavelli makes a critique of the classical 
republican thought which over-emphasizes unity and concord as inextricable 
dimensions of republicanism. Thus, through Roman experience of republic, he puts a 
question-mark against too much emphasis on republican unity and harmony. In this 
respect, although Machiavelli shares the same opinion with the classical republicanism 
in terms of political meaning and purpose of republicanism,
80
 he also makes an 
immanent critique of it.  
This Machiavellian revolution, as it is called by some of his interpreters, is not 
about republican ends, but the contents of the means to reach these ends.
81
 In this 
respect, Skinner argues that there is a further point on the republican tradition where 
Machiavelli seems to make his critique: he states that Machiavelli‟s formulation of the 
notion that political actions should be judged by their effects rather than their intrinsic 
rightness also tosses the belief that common good can be attained only if rulers act in a 
completely just manner.
82
 In The Discourses, Machiavelli explains that if a prudent 
organizer of a state has an intention to govern not for his own purposes but for the 
common good, and even if he takes extraordinary actions for the service of the kingdom 
or republic, he should not be blamed; because “it is a sound maxim that reprehensible 
actions may be justified by their effects, and that when the effect is good, as it was in 
the case of Romulus, it always justifies the action.”83 Therefore, as long as our actions 
serve for the common good, whether it is moral or immoral is not a very big concern. 
This in turn implies that if our actions that derive from morality do not serve for the 
common good, they should be avoided. Hence, in terms of the primacy of common 
good, Machiavelli follows the classical republican tradition.  
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Therefore, Machiavelli‟s republicanism preserves the classical republican 
thought but with a critical eye on it. As I have examined above, while trivializing the 
discord among citizens, surprisingly for classical republican thought that he values 
conflict between the nobility and commoners. He asserts that free cities are established 
out of this conflict. On the other hand, he also remarks that safeguarding of liberty 
should be entrusted to the plebs rather than the upper class for the latter would easily 
turn this power into corruption.
84
 This is the most significant component of the vivere 
politico for citizens. They are required to engage in political life by actively 
participating with every means into the affairs that are related to liberty of the city. It is 
not only important for the liberty but also for the greatness [grandezza] of the city.
85
 
Indeed, Machiavelli makes a connection between liberty and greatness of republics: “It 
is easy to see how this affection of peoples for self-government [del vivere libero] 
comes about, for experience shows that cities have never increased either in dominion 
or wealth, unless they have been independent.”86  
Having said considerably about Machiavelli‟s conceptualization of republics, we 
can conclude that in the center of Machiavelli‟s republicanism resides “free way of 
life.” In order to preserve this freedom, each citizen should actively participate into 
political life; they should act with virtue and place the common good above their private 
interests. If citizens act in this way, their republics can be maintained as powerful and 
wealthy. However, by active citizenship Machiavelli does not mean a sort of 
participatory democracy at all. In other words, civic engagement is not something 
valuable in itself but for Machiavelli it is rather a duty. In this respect, civic engagement 
is not about ruling the republic but making a division of labor to serve for the good of 
the republic.
87
 And this requires a particular attachment, a special love or patriotism for 
the patria where citizens live, so that they put the interests of the republic prior to their 
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own interests or ambitions. Hence, an examination of how Machiavelli describes his 
patria and the duties of citizens for their homelands will make this point more clear.   
I.III. Secular Patria and Patriotism of Machiavelli 
Patria in the works of Machiavelli is another controversial topic for various 
scholars. For some, he uses patria to emphasize his native city, Florence. In contrast, for 
others, he uses the term for the liberation and unification of the Italian peninsula. In 
either case, what is clear is that the political life and political affairs in Machiavelli‟s 
patria is free of religious doctrines. As I have tried to show with reference to The 
Prince, fortune or God does not manipulate worldly affairs which are predominantly of 
humans. It is the human reason and virtue that give shape to our political life. This is 
generally considered as the emancipation of politics from morality and religion.
88
 
Hence, in Machiavelli‟s republic, there is no hand of God but only citizens‟. However, 
this is not the end of story about Machiavelli and his opinion of religion. First of all, 
what is meant by religion and morality that Machiavelli opposes is the Christian 
morality. Contrary to his medieval predecessors, Machiavelli thinks that Christian 
teachings do not help citizens to enjoy their civic freedom but render people reluctant, 
weak, and indolent instead of motivating them to act.  
Machiavelli was not an anti-religious person. Nor was he against the power of 
religion in shaping the patria. In The Discourses, where he discusses religion, he talks 
about the importance of taking account of religion, and accuses the Roman Church of 
causing the lack of religion that finally led to the ruination of Italy.
89
 By this kind of 
religion he references the religion of ancient Roman citizens. He believes that what kept 
the Roman people united and in prosperity were the institutions and laws that were 
shaped by religious customs of citizens: “This is easy to understand provided one knows 
on what basis the religion of a man‟s homeland is founded, for every religion has the 
basis of its life rooted in some one of its main institutions.”90 He suggests that the rulers 
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of a republic or kingdom should keep the main principles of the religion that citizens 
practice; in so doing, they will be able to keep citizens religious, good, and united.
91
  
Therefore, rather than being against religions and morality, Machiavelli presents 
us two different conceptions of morality. On the one hand, he praises the ancient Roman 
religion, which is a type of pagan religion. The values of this religion are courage, 
power, solidity, order, discipline, and virtue.
92
 In the opposite direction of these values, 
however, stand the Christian morality, ideals of which are compassion, charity, 
generosity, love of God, forgiveness of enemies, belief in life after death, and belief in 
eternal salvation of human soul which is above all worldly, political or societal ends.
93
 
Whatever the values innate in Christianity are, they are impediments for the ideal 
society that Machiavelli wishes to (re)build. A life loaded with Christian morality leads 
to political weakness. Therefore, he suggests that if Italy wants to recover its glorious 
ancient times, it should get rid of its Christian education, and replace it with a better 
education that serves for the greatness of the republic.
94
  
However, reading The Discourses, one can see that his biggest anger is not to the 
Christianity itself, but the Roman Church and its teachings. As I have stated above, he is 
not against being religious; but Christian morality, together with the Roman Church, 
took away citizens‟ religious customs and practices: “Many are of opinion that the 
prosperity of Italian cities is due to the Church of Rome. I disagree…By the Court of 
Rome, Italy has lost all devotion and all religion…The first debt which we, Italians, owe 
to the Church and to priests, therefore, is that we have become irreligious and 
perverse.”95 Moreover, he argues that it is the Church, which kept Italy divided. He 
states that since Church had temporal power, and its headquarters were in Italy, it 
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attempted to occupy Italy. However, it was neither powerful enough to occupy whole 
Italy, nor weak enough to let anyone do it.
96
  
The most important reason for Machiavelli to be against the Church is that its 
teachings rendered citizens weak, and ascribed them less ambition for worldly honor. 
For him, just as anything in a republic should be organized to maintain stability and 
liberty, religion also should serve this purpose. On the other hand, what he observes in 
the Christian teachings is the opposite of this. That is why he praises the pagan religion 
of the ancient Rome while criticizing the Christian religion:  
If one asks oneself how it comes about that peoples of old were more fond 
of liberty than they are today, I think the answer is that it is due to the 
same cause that makes men today less bold than they used to be; and this 
is due, I think, to the difference between our education and that of bygone 
times, which is based on the difference between our religion and the 
religion of those days. For our religion, having taught us the truth and the 
true way of life, leads us to ascribe less esteem to worldly honor. Hence, 
the gentiles, who held it in high esteem and looked upon it as their highest 
good, displayed in their actions more ferocity than we do.
97
  
What Machiavelli wishes to see is not a man of contemplation and inaction, but man of 
action, who is strong and ready to defend his homeland. It is only from those who are 
active that freedom can be gained and maintained. However, as he states, Christian 
education glorifies “humble and contemplative men” whose highest good is “humility, 
abnegation, and contempt for mundane things,” whereas the religion of Rome was 
identified with “magnanimity, bodily strength, and everything else that conduces to 
make men very bold.”98 Hence, he is not against Christianity in its original form, but 
Christian education, which demands from its citizens to be strong to suffer instead of 
doing bold things.
99
  
 For Machiavelli, this kind of education makes people pursue a life on the way to 
achieve a place in paradise, and teaches them “how best to bear, rather than how best to 
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avenge, their injuries.”100 And this teaching is not originally Christian; it is only the 
misinterpretation of the Church, which interpreted Christianity in terms of laissez faire, 
instead of virtù.
101
 His conception of religion does not teach people to live for life after 
death, but to work and fight for the liberty of their homeland, have wisdom of the 
worldly affairs, passion for glory, wealth, and power. The Roman Church teaches the 
opposite and wrong interpretation: “For, had they borne in mind that religion permits us 
to exalt and defend the fatherland, they would have seen that it also wishes us to love 
and honor it, and to train ourselves to be such that we may defend it.”102  
 Hence, Machiavelli believes that religion serves not only for the unity of citizens 
but it also train them to love and defend their homeland. In this respect, as Viroli 
suggests, Machiavelli‟s patriotism is not irreligious or anti-Christian; it is only anti-
clerical.
103
 But this religion is not the religion of Christians, but the religion of Romans. 
Since he values independence and liberty of the republic above everything, he also 
instrumentalizes religion for the sake of maintaining the civilized state. He explains that 
citizens of Rome were more afraid of breaking an oath than breaking the law because 
they respected and feared the power of God more than the power of man.
104
 In this 
respect, he compares two rulers of the Roman Republic: Romulus and his successor 
Numa. Between them, although Romulus was the person who introduced a constitution 
for Rome, he thinks that Numa was more prudent, for he introduced religion into the 
city, and successfully turned religion into an instrument to keep people united.
105
 
Religion was the most important factor in the maintenance and prosperity of the Roman 
Republic because it helped to control armies, encourage the plebs, produce good men, 
and shame the bad.
106
 Therefore, he concludes that “the religion introduced by Numa 
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was among the primary causes of Rome‟s success, for this entailed good institutions; 
good institutions led to good fortune; and from good fortune arose the happy results of 
undertakings.”107  
I.IV Conclusion: Love of Patria 
 In short, Machiavelli asserts that the highest esteem of citizens should be the 
common good and liberty rather than their own interests. It is justified for them to do it 
in any necessary means because the most important thing is the maintenance of the 
common good. Therefore, they should always be active and united in establishing their 
laws and institutions, and defending them whenever necessary. They should put the 
common good beyond their own ambitions and interests, “for it is not the well-being of 
individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the community; and it is 
beyond question that it is only in republics that the common good is looked to properly 
in that all the promotes it is carried out; and, however much this or that private person 
may be the loser on this account, there are so many who benefit thereby that the 
common good can be realized in spite of those few who suffer in consequence.”108 
Hence, for the sake of the common good, citizens must be ready to sacrifice themselves 
as well.   
 However, this requires a sentiment or feeling in people to be able to do these 
things. It is where Machiavelli‟s patriotism comes to the fore. As I have examined 
above, people should be trained properly that love of patria and thus love of liberty will 
be instilled in them. Since the Christian Church destroyed all the old religious 
institutions and customs of Romans, peoples of Italy lack such a feeling to defend their 
liberties. Their love of God, and desire to have a seat in paradise, prevent them from 
working for their worldly affairs. And Christianity evolved in this direction only 
because of the misinterpretation of the sacred texts by the Roman Church. Hence, he 
suggests that the source of such patriotic feeling resides in the proper education of 
religion, which would teach citizens to love their homeland, and fight for it whenever 
this becomes necessary.   
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 Patria, for Machiavelli, signifies the political institutions and a particular way of 
life which cannot be distinguished from culture and customs. It is a particular way of 
life in liberty [vivere libera] which is not the individual but common liberty.
109
 In a 
famous letter to Vettori, where he says that “I love my patria more than my soul,” he 
underlines, by patria, a particular way of life in particular liberty, which belongs to him 
as much as anyone else.
110
 Out of this love, citizens serve for the well-being of their 
republics. On the other hand, when love of country and laws of the country is not 
enough to keep people united to defend their homeland, religion comes to help, as it was 
the case in Rome, thanks to Numa.
111
  
 After all, Machiavelli‟s good citizens are patriotic citizens, who value the 
common good and common liberty more than their own well-being. It is their duty to 
serve for the republic, and when necessary, die for it. Citizens should serve in the 
military while defending their countries, and work in the institutions of the republic in 
order to maintain their liberty. In the course of serving for the republic, they should be 
in pursuit of the common good. If necessary, they should use immoral measures to 
achieve his/her purposes because justice is of secondary importance compared to the 
common good. Hence, s/he should protect the republic with anything necessary to do it. 
However, his/her primary duty is to obey the laws in any circumstances. The most 
striking example Machiavelli gives in this respect is the killing of the sons of Brutus: 
“He who establishes a tyranny and does not kill „Brutus‟, and he who establishes a free 
state and does not kill „the Sons of Brutus‟, will not last long.”112  
 Therefore, according to Machiavelli, service for the patria is valuable than 
anything else, and above all, it is the duty of every citizen who feel love of country; 
because only if citizens defend independence of their country in a prudent way, they can 
enjoy their civic freedom. Citizenship is not a matter of membership to a community or 
state, but it is defined by the civic duty, the service that citizens perform for the well-
being of their community. Machiavelli‟s citizens work for the common good instead of 
their private interests, because they know that as long as they work for the well-being of 
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their patria, they can satisfy their private interests as well. However, if their homeland 
is under internal or external threat, be it corruption internally or war externally, they 
cannot pursue their interests either. Therefore, they should feel love for their country, 
have disposition to its laws and institutions which are the building stones of liberty. 
Citizens can be free only as long as their patria is secure and independent. They should 
harmoniously work for and take care of their patria.  
 However, since men are bad in nature, it is very easy for them to corrupt and go 
out of this way. In case they turn to their private dispositions, they should be trained and 
educated to become good citizens. In this respect, religious training is required to instill 
love of patria and fear of God in citizen‟s hearts. This religion is not the one that the 
Roman Church teaches but the “true Christianity” or what Beiner calls “paganization of 
Christianity,”113 which maintains the ancient Roman religious customs that would keep 
citizens active. It is also the starting point of the notion of “civil religion” which will 
later be taken up by Rousseau, who also emphasizes this notion to create strong bonds 
among citizens.
114
  
 As a member of the republican tradition, Rousseau moves Machiavelli‟s 
conception of citizenship and patriotism one step further by adding a moral value to the 
community embodied in the organization of a state. In this respect, instead of resorting 
to Aristotle, unlike Machiavelli, he is influenced by Plato in terms of conceptualizing 
the community and society as the chief moralizing agency, where not men but citizens 
can achieve justice and freedom.
115
 It is only the society in which individuals develop 
their mental and moral capacities. For him, being a “good man” can be important only 
in the state of nature. After the evolution of complex societies, however, people moved 
away from their state of nature, and formed an artificial political organization. Then, 
people started to acquire their mental and moral faculties from this artificial community. 
Since human faculties can only develop in the community that people live, there is no 
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moral qualities outside of it.
116
 Hence, “good man” in nature coalesces into “good 
citizen” in the community of which people belong.117  
 In terms of historical development of republican tradition, Rousseau is 
considered as one of the cornerstones within republicanism. He takes the classical 
definition of republicanism as the rule of citizens who are limited and bound by the laws 
and institutions through which the common good is reflected and protected, and 
synthesizes this understanding with the idea of human rights originating from the 
natural law theory.
118
 Hence, Rousseau‟s republic is a body politic, a social order, in 
which citizens acquire social justice as well as political legitimacy through laws and 
institutions. However, laws and institutions are not enough for a republic to maintain its 
existence; it primarily requires active citizens as guardians of their republic. In other 
words, it requires a republican patriotism through which citizens devote themselves to 
their nation and republic by putting aside their factional interests that would be 
dangerous for the unity and harmony of the society.
119
 To do this, citizens must be given 
a pedagogical training starting from their childhood to become virtuous citizens. But 
most importantly, they require a religious teaching. In this respect, Rousseau follows 
Machiavelli but he even goes further by suggesting a truly secular religion, which he 
calls “civil religion.”120 Indeed, Rousseau‟s patriotic education itself becomes the 
religion of citizens.
121
 Thus, the rest of the thesis will continue with Rousseau‟s 
republicanism and patriotism. To this end, first of all, I will dwell on his idea of popular 
sovereignty as citizens‟ right of democratic self-determination and self-rule. It is a new 
dimension that Rousseau brings to the republican tradition, which will soon be 
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embraced by Kant as “people as law-giver.” Then, I will explore Rousseau‟s conception 
of patriotism as civil religion.  
II. Rousseau: Citizen of Geneva 
 Rousseau, an eighteenth-century thinker, is one of the most influential 
philosophers contributing to European intellectual history along with his 
contemporaries, such as Hume, Kant, and Montesquieu. The issues he addressed from 
democracy, civic equality to political autonomy have so far had a profound impact on 
the moral and political theory. Just as Machiavelli, he has been subjected to various 
interpretations, for his political theory allegedly contains elements of totalitarianism and 
individualism. Russell, for example, argues that those who called themselves reformers 
follow two lines: Rousseau and Locke. And he further claims that Hitler was the 
outcome of Rousseau, whereas Roosevelt and Churchill were of Locke.
122
 That he 
almost removes the boundaries between the individual and the society through his 
concept of general will (voloné générale), and his emphasis on civil religion (religion 
civile), make him a pen of totalitarianism, who beats a path to Hegel, the thinker of 
absolute state.
123
  
 On the other hand, there is another view that considers Rousseau as a defender 
of natural law theory because of his theory of social contract. In this respect, especially 
John C. Hall even goes further to argue that Rousseau‟s citizen was an economic man; 
and he seeks to present Rousseau as an advocate of utilitarian individualism.
124
 
Rousseau‟s these two extreme interpretations show that his writings are not easy to 
grasp; nor are they very straightforward. However, reading Rousseau and interpreting 
him as a “father of totalitarianism” does not sound valid; it can only be considered as a 
consequence of the search for a scapegoat in the history to explain the “dark times” of 
the twentieth century. Nor is it plausible to conclude that Rousseau was a liberal 
thinker; again, it can only be a weak attempt to rescue his name from the label of 
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totalitarianism. Therefore, as Pettit suggests, interpreting Rousseau requires an approach 
that is dismissive of the sounds of populism.
125
   
 Rousseau was neither the intellectual father of totalitarianism, nor the 
philosopher of liberalism. What he tries to do, however, is a sort of reconciliation 
between moral freedom or moral self-determination of individuals, and ethical self-
realization or popular sovereignty of citizens.
126
 In his engagement with the puzzle of 
rights versus duties, he points out an everlasting debate between liberal and republican 
traditions, which goes all the way back to Locke and is still continuing with the 
deliberative model developed by Habermas. The competing arguments between liberal 
and civic republican strands on the primacy of human rights or popular sovereignty 
underpin the tension between moral-private autonomy of individuals and ethical-
political autonomy of citizens. These two ideas, whether mutually exclusive or mutually 
complementary, have been at the center of constitutionalism debates, and thus, had a 
constitutive impact on constitutional democracies. Rousseau is one of the key 
intellectual stands contributing to this debate. He mainly seeks to find an internal 
connection between human rights and democratic self-legislation. This is a task which is 
later undertaken by Kant, and finally arrived to Habermas. Both Rousseau and Kant 
seek to establish internal relation between human rights and popular sovereignty with a 
claim that they mutually shape and interpret each other. On the other hand, in search of 
a solution for this puzzle, Habermas explains, they fail to find a balance between private 
and public autonomy: whereas Kant resorts to the liberal reading of political autonomy, 
Rousseau makes its rather republican reading.
127
      
 Yet, the intention of this thesis is not to discuss political philosophy of Rousseau 
at length; rather it has a more modest purpose: in search of the patterns in modern 
republicanism, whose foundation was set down by Machiavelli, I will discuss in what 
respects Rousseau follows Machiavelli, and in what respects he diverges from him. In 
so doing, I aim to point out Rousseau‟s conception of citizenship, and his idea of 
patriotism as the soul of citizenship.  To summarize in a few words, and again only in 
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terms of the purpose of this paper, 1) what I find new in Rousseau compared to 
Machiavelli‟s republicanism is the idea of popular sovereignty; 2) what I find in 
Rousseau as a sort of critique of Machiavelli is the emphasis on harmony and unity, and 
thus homogeneity in all respects; 3) and what I find in Rousseau as a continuity with 
Machiavelli is the notion of “civil religion” to provide civic attachment among citizens. 
Therefore, in the rest of the paper, I will dwell on these aspects of Rousseau‟s 
republicanism.  
II.I Search for a Well-Ordered Society 
 What can be the ideal “form of association which defends and protects with all 
common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each 
one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as 
before?”128 This is the main puzzle or question that Rousseau investigates in order to 
construct a well-ordered society in which citizens, united around the common good, find 
justice and freedom. His solution for this fundamental problem is the social contract 
through which individuals give up their natural liberty to gain their civil or conventional 
liberty.
129
 Outside the social contract, there is the state of nature where humans neither 
engage in moral relations nor perform duties for others; they can neither be good nor 
evil since there is no idea of virtue or vice.
130
  
 In the state of nature, humans are not very different from that of animals with 
some exceptions. One of the exceptions that distinguish humans from animals is 
humans‟ faculty of self-perfection or perfectibility. Rousseau describes this faculty as 
the source of all people‟s misfortunes.131 Self-perfection renders humanity progressive 
in the sense that they finally go out of the state of nature and “pass tranquil and innocent 
days; that this is what, through centuries of giving rise to his enlightenment and his 
errors, his vices and his virtues, eventually makes him a tyrant over himself and 
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nature.”132 Unlike animals, due to the faculty of self-perfection, humans are able to 
accumulate knowledge and transmit it through generations. This is also the faculty, 
which led the person, who enclosed a plot of land and took it as his property, to say 
“this is mine.”133 Hence, self-perfection directly or indirectly created an environment in 
which people moved from absolute equal conditions with unrestrained natural liberty 
towards the first moments of inequality.  
 Development of human faculties let people discover both themselves and others 
around them. Through their contacts with each other for various reasons, they develop a 
sentiment that Rousseau calls “self-love” [amour propre], which is distinguished from 
“love of well-being” [amour de soi]. Unlike amour de soi, as humans‟ concern for self-
protection and self-sufficiency, amour propre is the sentiment that connects individuals 
with each other, bind them, and render them interdependent because this sort of self-
love is reflected only in the eyes of others. Therefore, it is also a desire for reputation 
and honors, which make “all men competitors, rivals, or rather enemies.”134 This 
sentiment also drives people to gain power over humans, and increase the gap of 
inequality among them, since their desire to have reputation gives them a passion to 
gain more power and more wealth against others.
135
  
 Rousseau explains that it is not material self-interest but amour propre which is 
the main cause of corruption in a society. People are so much obsessed with seeing 
themselves in the eyes of others that they lose their self-sufficiency and become 
dependent on others.  Hence, they start to look for the ways to establish superiority over 
others. The search for more power in the name of force, glory, wealth or reputation, 
goes even further to the point that even the expansion of science, art and commerce 
bring about more artificial inequalities instead of diminishing them.
136
 It eventually 
creates so much disorder, fights, wars, and thus corruption that they require to form a 
political organization. In the end, through the process of rupture from the state of nature 
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towards an artificial society, power and differences among people lead to various types 
of government from monarchy and aristocracy to democracy.
137
  
 Since humans have lost touch with the state of nature by forming various types 
of governments, and by going through endless process of perfection, Rousseau argues 
that human passions, together with our faculties to direct these passions, lead to the final 
stage of inequality, the extreme point where only the strongest one‟s will becomes the 
law; and all private individuals turn to be equals again.
138
 In this situation, since masters 
will not rule with justice but only with their passions, the notions of good and justice 
vanishes to the point in the state of nature. Thus, this is the stage what Rousseau calls “a 
new state of nature,” which is different from the previous one, in the sense that whereas 
the latter was “the state of nature in its purity, and this last one is the fruit of an excess 
of corruption.”139  
 This is briefly the main reason, which Rousseau describes in Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality, for him to begin his On the Social Contract with the following 
sentences: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. He who believes himself 
the master of others does not escape being more of a slave than they.”140 As individuals 
come to be dependent on each other in the process of socialization, their passions, self-
interests and ambitions pull them into corruption. They had absolute freedom in the 
state of nature, which they left there through socialization and interdependence, but they 
could not replace another freedom in this new stage. That is why although they are born 
free, and no matter how much power they hold over others, they are still in chains. 
Hence, his proposal of social contract comes with a claim to replace this natural 
freedom with the fullest one, moral freedom. This moral freedom, which is also called 
autonomy, is better than the one in the state of nature, because natural freedom simply 
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means absence of interference from others but autonomy brings this freedom up to a 
level of self-mastery.
141
  
 Social contract is his first moment of founding a well-ordered society, which 
will prevent people from turning to the sphere of extreme corruption that he calls the 
new state of nature. By social contract, he means people‟s act of forming an association 
in which each member, under perfectly equal conditions, give itself and his private 
rights to the entire community: “Each of us places his person and all his power in 
common under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one we receive each 
member as an indivisible part of the whole.”142 Through this social contract, individual 
persons become public persons establishing a republic or body politic; and since they 
are the participants of the sovereign authority, they are called citizens.
143
 In this way, 
they exchange their corrupt dependence with a legitimate dependence in the 
community.
144
 
 Social contract is the transition of humans from the state of nature to the civil 
state. In this political organization, people replace their instincts with a notion of justice; 
physical drives with duty; and appetite with right. In this way, their behaviors attain a 
moral quality.
145
 People also lose their natural liberty and unlimited right to everything 
but in return, gain civil liberty limited by the general will. In other words, by sacrificing 
their natural liberties, people, in a state, gain an artificial environment in which they can 
exercise and develop their faculties, and expand their imagination and ideas; and 
through this process, their actions are driven by liberty with a moral quality, which 
“makes man truly the master of himself.”146  
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 Unlike Machiavelli‟s republic, where citizens actively engage in preserving the 
common good by building necessary laws and institutions, and allow the prudent 
leaders to rule the republic, Rousseau‟s active citizenship requires individuals to melt 
their individual selves in the general will, and through their actions towards the 
formulation of the common good, they become the sovereign self of the state, which is 
indivisible and inalienable.
147
 Nevertheless, this general will does not represent the will 
of all or the interests of each individuals but the common interest. In this respect, they 
are perfectly equal in expressing their ideas related to the principles of the general will 
through public deliberation. Finally, out of public deliberation, they create laws that 
represent the general will. Therefore, while the common good becomes the general will, 
people become subject to the laws that they decide to obey; they become the sovereign 
of the state.  
 This idea of popular sovereignty, which Rousseau brings up as an innovation to 
the classical republican tradition, however, does not leave room for partial associations 
although he admits that there can be small differences. He argues that he is in line with 
Machiavelli in this point, for he quotes from Machiavelli that “„It is true‟ says 
Machiavelli, „that some divisions are harmful to the republic while others are helpful to 
it. Those that are accompanied by sects and partisan factions are harmful. Since, 
therefore, a ruler of a republic cannot prevent enmities from arising within it, he at least 
ought to prevent them from becoming sects.”148 On the other hand, as I have discussed 
above, Machiavelli argues that liberty in the Roman Republic could be preserved only 
thanks to the clash between the plebs and the nobility. In Rousseau‟s republic, however, 
the meaning, content and value of the general will is the same for every citizen without 
exceptions: “For the general will to be well articulated, it is therefore important that 
there should be no partial society in the state and that each citizen make up his own 
mind.”149 Hence, with a sharp break with Machiavelli, Rousseau emphasizes the 
absolute unity and harmony.  
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 However, Rousseau‟s idea that people should give up their partial interests and 
actively engage in public deliberation to extract the general will and thus the common 
good of a society is not only a suggestion. There must be a motivation for citizens to act 
in this way. And this motivation will be given to people by the institutions of a state. 
These institutions will provide citizens with a pedagogical training through which each 
individual “believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer feels 
except within the whole. A citizen of Rome was neither Caius nor Lucius; he was a 
Roman.”150  Hence, for him, social institutions will “denature” people in order to take 
his absolute being and transform it into the common unity,
151
 because it is only those 
citizens who could transform their self into the self of the whole can be eligible to make 
and obey their own laws.  
 This is also related to Rousseau‟s attempt of reconciliation between human 
rights deriving from natural law and the common good. As Froese rightly suggests, the 
social contract Rousseau proposes sits on a balance between a disposition to separate 
oneself from the community, and the disposition to integrate into it.
152
 Between these 
two neither mutually exclusive nor easily reconcilable directions that people are driven, 
they develop their faculties to become both masters of themselves and part of a larger 
whole. In this ambivalent situation, therefore, people can neither completely feel home 
in the community, nor they completely feel alienated from it; in order to get rid of this 
ambivalence, they must continuously work for reconstructing their bonds.
153
  
 In this sense, social institutions play a major role in the process of motivating 
citizens to feel that they belong to the community that they live. Instead of forcing 
people to perform their citizenship duties, these institutions educate citizens to love their 
duties and compatriots. Here, what Machiavelli has initiated as “paganization of 
Christianity” reappears in the republicanism of Rousseau with a more concrete program 
and a name, which he calls “civil religion.” In Rousseau, the secular training of 
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patriotism itself becomes a religious practice of the republic.
154
 In so doing, it occupies 
the heart of republicanism and acquires a very significant position. Through civil 
religion, citizens obtain the appropriate character as a result of which they will to get 
into civic engagement as compatriots. Hence, civil religion reflects what Tocqueville 
calls “habits of the heart,” what Machiavelli calls good laws, and what Rousseau calls 
moeurs.
155
  
II.II Molding Citizens: Rousseau’s Patriotism and “Civil Religion” 
 Social contract and civil laws guide citizens to virtuous actions. However, it is 
only one part of the story. In the other part, social contract requires virtuous citizens.
156
 
In other words, a genuine contract requires virtues citizens, whereas it is also this 
contract that makes citizens virtuous. To solve this dilemma, Rousseau asks how 
citizens can be virtuous. The answer resides in Rousseau‟s conception of patriotism as a 
sentiment: “Do we want people to be virtuous? Let us begin then by making them love 
their country.”157 But this time another question arises: “how can they love it?”158 
Rousseau answers this question from two different angles: 1) “Let the homeland…show 
itself as the common mother of all citizens;”159 and more importantly 2) as a state, make 
“each citizen have a religion that causes him to love his duties.”160  
 Through an instrumental reasoning, Rousseau thinks that if a citizen cannot 
enjoy civil welfare; that is, if her life, liberty, and property depend on the mercy of 
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powerful masters, then the word “country” can only have ridiculous meaning for her.161 
Therefore, the first condition for citizens to love their country is to provide them with 
goods and opportunities, as well as liberty, to meet their needs and satisfy their private 
interests. For him, it is not against the principle that the common good must have 
primacy over private interests of individuals, because he asserts that the welfare of each 
citizen can be a common cause as much as the welfare of the state.
162
 Above all, the 
state must respect the inviolable rights of all citizens. In this respect, he suggests that “if 
someone were to tell us that it is good that one person should perish for all, I would 
admire this saying when it comes from the lips of a worthy and virtuous patriot who 
dedicates himself willingly and out of duty to die for the welfare of his country. But if 
this means that the government is permitted to sacrifice an innocent person for the 
welfare of the multitude, I hold this maxim to be one of the most despicable that tyranny 
has ever invented…”163 Therefore, if a state wishes its citizens to love their country, the 
first thing it must do is to create a proper environment in which they can enjoy the 
advantages of being a member of that particular state. In other words, individuals should 
have the consciousness of the benefits that they obtain by being a part of the state. The 
best way to do it is to reserve them enough positions in the public administration so that 
“they can feel that they are at home.”164   
 On the other hand, this instrumental reasoning to love one‟s country does not 
alone keep citizens loyal to the state; it should be supplemented by intrinsic reasons of 
sentiment.
165
 To this end, Rousseau argues that amour propre should be cultivated, and 
put under the command of reason so that it can serve for the good purposes, rather than 
cause corruption. He states that citizens must live “under the eyes of their compatriots, 
seeking public approbation.”166 He states that providing citizens with everything they 
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need and expect them to become good citizens is not sufficient; they must be taught 
how to be virtuous citizens. And virtue in citizens can only be created by the sentiment 
of love of country: “the greatest support for public authority lies in the hearts of 
citizens.”167 Here, amour propre as self-love comes into picture together with taught 
virtue and becomes “the most heroic of all the passions.”168 Through social institutions, 
the state must teach citizens to change amour propre into a passion for the well-being of 
a state and compatriots. In this respect, public education plays a significant role in 
shaping citizens.
169
  
 However, the most essential part of shaping citizens is to change the tone and 
content of the religion that citizens believe. Indeed, Rousseau‟s thought on religion is 
where his patriotism gets crystallized. In the beginning of the chapter, titled “On Civil 
Religion” in On the Social Contract, he argues that “at first men had no other kings but 
the gods, and no other government than a theocratic one.”170 Hence, Rousseau states 
that there is no state in history, establishment of which is not based on religion. From 
this point of view, he asserts that social spirit, shared feelings and solidarity that a 
republic relies on, cannot be provided solely by laws and institutions; even life-long 
civic education can be insufficient unless it is reinforced by a religious education.
171
 
Therefore, in Rousseau, we see the rise of patriotism to the level of religion.  
 Rousseau defines civil religion as “a purely civil profession of faith, the articles 
of which it belongs to the sovereign to establish, not exactly as dogmas of religion, but 
as sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a 
faithful subject.”172 In this sense, civil religion diverges from other religions. In general, 
he asserts that there are two types of religions, namely the religion of man and citizen. 
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Whereas the former is merely about the eternal duties of morality, based on the Gospel, 
and thus called “natural divine law,” the latter belongs to particular countries in the 
sense that it has its own dogmas, rituals, its own gods, and cult prescribed by laws.
173
 
Apart from these religions, there is the third kind of religion which Rousseau describes 
as the most bizarre. In this religion, people are given two sets of legislation, two leaders, 
and two homelands which cause confusions and contradictory duties among people.
174
 
An example of this bizarre type is Roman Christianity, which is “so bad that it is a 
waste of time to amuse oneself by proving it.”175  
 These two sorts of religions, that of men and citizen, are good in nature but they 
have some faults.  First of all, the religion of citizen, whose rules are coded as positive 
divine law, is a decent one in uniting citizens around a divine cult, with a sacred 
homeland for which dying means being martyrs. In this religion, serving for one‟s 
country is the same as service to the God. Therefore, Rousseau describes this religion of 
a particular country as a sort of theocracy in which disobedience to laws makes a citizen 
nothing but impious.
176
 These features of this religion are good in terms of uniting 
citizens around a single purpose. However, it is also bad for the very same reasons 
making it good: it is based on errors and lies that deceive people, and make them 
believe in superstitions. It gets even worse under a tyrannical rule because it is so 
exclusive that people become intolerant and bloodthirsty.
177
  
 Second, the religion of men, which Rousseau means Christianity not of our day 
but of the Gospel, is good in nature as well. It is the true religion, which makes people 
acknowledge each other as brothers, and thus children of the same God. However, this 
religion has no affairs in the world. It detaches the love of country from hearts of 
citizens and ties it to the homeland in the other world. In this sense, since it has nothing 
to do with this world, believers of this religion would not care for the well-being, and 
arrange their lives according to the rules of God and heaven. If a war breaks out, 
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citizens unquestionably go to war but not to fight, but to die since they have no passion 
for victory. Hence, Christianity in its pure form leads to indifference to the earthly 
affairs such as prosperity and safety of the citizens, and because of this, it makes 
citizens vulnerable to seizure of public authority, since “in this vale of sorrows, what 
does it matter whether we are free men or serfs?”178 Therefore, Christianity also fails to 
create virtuous citizens who feel love of their countries.  
 After that, Rousseau presents us his own conception of religion. This religion is 
designed to unite citizens in love of country and loyalty to it, and create respect for the 
laws and institutions of a state.
179
 Its dogmas are simple, few in number, clearly and 
well written that requires no explanations. These positive dogmas prescribe “the 
happiness of the just; the punishment of the wicked; the sanctity of the social contract 
and of the laws.”180 As a negative dogma, Rousseau excludes intolerance. He points out 
the fact that there can no longer be any exclusive national religion. For this reason, 
citizens must tolerate each other as long as their dogmas are not against the duties of 
their citizenship.  
 Thus, against Christian teaching that harms citizens‟ passion of liberty, 
Rousseau envisages a civil religion which would reinforce social bonds in the society 
and loyalty to the laws and institutions of republic. It will make citizens love their 
duties, and render them “good citizens.” Rousseau‟s civil religion is a secular religion of 
a nation which gathers citizens around one general will and common good, and thus, 
guarantees free way of life.
181
 Therefore, civil religion can be considered as the 
codification of his patriotism; he sets down principles and dogmas on how to become 
virtuous citizens who feel love of country. Hence, in Rousseau, patriotism itself 
becomes the civil religion: citizens who believe in this religion are all but compatriots. 
Those who claim to acknowledge the rules and dogmas of civil religion but do not act in 
this way, however, should be put to death for they lied before the laws, which is the 
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worst crime for them.
182
 In this sense, Rousseau sacrifices plurality and opposition for 
the sake of a sense of belonging and unity in the community; his republicanism turns 
into a community life in pathologies.
183
  
II.III Conclusion: From Machiavelli to Rousseau 
 Although we can find many differences and divergences between the 
republicanism of Machiavelli and Rousseau, in terms of their conception of patriotism, 
we can rather find much continuity. Unlike Machiavelli, who partly instrumentalizes 
citizens‟ participation to political life not only for the common good but also to secure 
their private interests, political participation becomes a keystone of Rousseau‟s 
republicanism. Rousseau‟s republic depends on the participation of virtuous citizens. 
Again, while Machiavelli‟s republicanism allows for pursuit of private interests, albeit 
in the framework of laws, Rousseau‟s republicanism underlines the unity of individual 
opinions around a single general will.  
 However, when it comes to the question of “why citizens should love their 
patria,” they more or less give the same answer. For Machiavelli, citizens should love 
their country partly because they can live a prosperous life or become powerful only in 
the community that they belong; and partly because if they do not love and protect the 
liberty of their country, they cannot enjoy their freedom either. This question finds a 
similar answer from Rousseau‟s republicanism. For Rousseau, first of all, a country 
must give its citizens a reason to make them love their country. It must at least provide 
them with something that they cannot find or attain outside of the country. However, he 
further suggests that citizens should love their country because they are united with it as 
its sovereign and subject at the same time. They enjoy their moral freedom and 
autonomy inside the community that they belong, and when they go outside of it, they 
find themselves in the state of nature. Moreover, if they do not feel love of country, but 
obsessed with the primitive instinct of amour propre, they eventually find themselves in 
a new state of nature caused by corruption and disorder. Therefore, their pursuit of good 
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life must merge with the good of the country so that they can correspond to their both 
moral and material need.  
 As for the question of “how citizens can love their patria,” Machiavelli and 
Rousseau also follow similar lines by bringing up a secularized form of religion, which 
teaches citizens how to become virtuous. We can observe that both thinkers are against 
the Christian teachings. And both of them suggest the virtues of the ancients to include 
in the religious teaching. However, on this matter, there is a slight difference between 
them: whereas Machiavelli asserts that religious teaching will instill in people a fear of 
God as well as love of patria, Rousseau‟s civil religion is “a deliberate construct” which 
is “designed to encourage „sentiments of sociability‟” rather than fear.184  
 In conclusion, although there are many thinkers contributing to debates in 
republicanism, such as Harrington, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville, I briefly examined 
the republicanism of Machiavelli and Rousseau, because as I will try to reveal in the 
next part, the return of republicanism as a new solution to societal problems, was 
conducted by the contemporary thinkers who are deeply inspired by them. By 
reexamining their works with a new method, they claim to prove that republicanism is 
still a valid suggestion that deserves attention.  
 In addition to this, there is another reason for selecting these philosophers rather 
than others. The main purpose of this paper is not to trace the origins and development 
of republicanism. If it was so, I would have to dwell on almost each republican thinker; 
because the historical journey of republicanism, from ancient Greece to Italy, from Italy 
to the Netherlands, England, and France, and eventually to the New World, requires 
more careful exploration. On the other hand, I examined Machiavelli to reveal the 
secular foundations of patriotism in the works of one of the first “Renaissance men.” 
Next, I investigated the contributions of Rousseau, “one of the last and latest 
Renaissance men,”185 to republican patriotism, foundations of which were laid down by 
Machiavelli. In so doing, I aimed to show that although we can observe sharp 
divergences among philosophers on republicanism, when it comes to patriotism, they 
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tell us similar things; because for them, whatever their republic looks like, it requires 
patriotism for its viability.      
III. Revival of Republicanism: The Cambridge School and Viroli’s Patriotism 
 From the nineteenth century onwards, modern republicanism lost its influence in 
political philosophy. One of the reasons for disappearance of republicanism is the ever-
alluring power of liberalism vis-à-vis the former in terms of responding the demands of 
the nineteenth-century commercial and democratic society. This “formidable success” 
of liberalism, as Viroli puts it, brought it an autonomous and superior position against 
republicanism.
186
 It even went further with the liberal critiques attacking on republican 
conception of freedom that republicanism, in the end, became devalued due to its 
alleged position, seemingly being against freedom of individuals.
187
 Another reason for 
the decline of republican tradition from political philosophy is the rise of Marxism 
starting from the first half of the twentieth century. Against individualism and 
utilitarianism of liberal school, Marxism used the concepts of “collective 
responsibility,” “common interest” and “virtuous citizenship,” which were some of the 
components of modern republicanism.
188
 In this process, while republicanism lost its 
place in political philosophy, and liberalism established its domination; republican 
notion of patriotism was also subsumed in the boundaries of nation-states, and merged 
with the arguments of nationalism.  
 However, in the second half of the twentieth century, through in-depth and 
careful studies of historians and philosophers from the Cambridge School, 
republicanism gained a new momentum. In the 1960s, some leading thinkers of the 
Cambridge School, such as Pocock, Skinner, Dunn, and Laslett, developed a new 
method to analyze historical concepts within their social and political environment. 
They rejected making textual analyses of the works of philosophers in history. Instead, 
they put these works into a context by asking how and why those philosophers wrote 
such things; and why they used such language or concepts. Hence, they call themselves 
contextualists in the sense that they try to find out how and why concepts, which 
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philosophers of the past invented and are still in use today, were developed in those 
times.  
 The invention of contextualism motivated some scholars to reconsider the works 
of ancient and early modern thinkers such as Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke. 
They also reexamined the classical republican thought to find a cure for the pathologies 
of the twentieth-century. Particularly, and maybe surprisingly, they looked for the 
meaning of liberty in the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes, who had usually been 
considered as the theorists of the absolute state. Skinner, for example, tried to find a 
republican conception of freedom in his book, Liberty before Liberalism; sought for 
Hobbes‟s idea of liberty in Hobbes and Republican Liberty; and contextualized 
Machiavelli in his famous work, Machiavelli – A Very Short Introduction. Similarly, 
Pocock investigated the republican spirit in Machiavelli in Machiavellian Moment. 
Viroli explored Machiavelli‟s republicanism and patriotism in Machiavelli and 
Machiavelli’s God. He also applied the same method to Rousseau‟s political philosophy 
in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the ‘Well-Ordered Society’. And finally, Philip Pettit, 
another member of the Cambridge School, wrote a book, titled Republicanism: A 
Theory of Freedom and Government, which reconceptualized and reconstructed the idea 
of liberty based on the republican tradition in an analytic and compact way. In the book, 
Pettit defined liberty as non-domination as opposed to Isaiah Berlin‟s definitions of 
negative and positive liberty. Through this “new but republican” definition of freedom, 
republicanism regained its chair, which had been empty for a long time, in the room of 
political philosophy.   
III.I The Cambridge School: The Idea of Freedom as Non-Domination 
 “Consider the fact that so great a political philosopher as Jean Bodin believed 
there to be witches in league with the devil. Or the fact that so great a student of nature 
as Aristotle believed that bodies change quality whenever they change place.”189 In 
times of Jean Bodin, the truth or reality was that there were witches. Similarly, Aristotle 
believed that quality of bodies change whenever people change their places. In our day, 
however, these beliefs do not sound rational although they were perfectly rational in the 
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past. Nevertheless, we still consider that Bodin and Aristotle were great philosophers, 
because we select what we find rational in their philosophy and skip the rest. If one asks 
why we find rational the things that we select in Aristotle and Bodin as rational, we give 
our causal explanations. In order to explain why we find the rest irrational, again we 
come up with that conclusion from our causal explanations; and while we skip the 
things we find irrational in their teachings, we also skip their causal explanations.  
 Starting from the 1960s, this approach to history of philosophy seemed 
inappropriate by some of the most prominent historians from the Cambridge School. 
They came up with a new method for historical explorations with a justification that “if 
the belief proves to be one that it was rational for the agent to have held, we shall need 
to investigate the conditions of that achievement.”190 In doing so, members of the 
Cambridge School do not merely investigate and examine historical texts as a part of 
history of thought; rather, they problematize political life by considering that historical 
texts, which are parts of history of politics, are also “political actions” which had an 
impact on the political life of their inditement.
191
  
 The intellectual background of the methodology of the Cambridge School was 
very deep but historians of the school were mainly influenced by the philosophy of 
history developed by Robin Collingwood, and speech act theory of John Austin.
192
 
Based on these two dimensions of their method, the Cambridge School historians put 
ideas and concepts into context with a purpose that they could explain the present from 
the past. For this purpose, Pocock and Skinner returned to the texts of Hobbes and 
Machiavelli with a new question in mind: considering, for example, Machiavelli‟s The 
Prince as a conclusion, how did Machiavelli come to this conclusion? In this way, 
against the idea that concepts should be carried to a sphere beyond time and space to 
analyze (textualism), they explore such texts in their historicity. The reason for this is 
that while analyzing texts beyond time and space, we understand the concepts that we 
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encounter from today‟s perspective. However, their meaning can be different from what 
we understand from these concepts.  
 With this methodology in mind, a thinker influenced by the Cambridge School, 
Philip Pettit, revitalized the tradition of republicanism.  The essential contribution of 
Pettit to the republican tradition is his (re)conceptualization of republican liberty. He 
points out that republican conception of liberty relies on three axioms: “the reality of 
personal choice; the possibility of alien control; and the positionality of alien 
control.”193 Based on this framework, against Isaiah Berlin‟s two conceptions of 
freedom, he comes up with another definition of freedom, which he claims is ultimately 
republican: “freedom as non-domination.” He argues that Berlin‟s conceptualizations − 
freedom as absence of interference, and freedom as self-mastery − amount to different 
meanings.
194
 By taking elements from each conceptualization of Berlin, Pettit defines 
liberty as “non-domination,” which means “absence of mastery.”195  
 According to Berlin, the difference between liberal conception of liberty and 
republican one is that whereas the former means negative freedom as absence of 
interference, the latter underlines positive freedom as being master of oneself.
196
 In this 
sense, liberal freedom emphasizes that as long as individuals have freedom of choice in 
their actions, that is, as long as their actions and choices are not interfered by any 
outside force, then individuals enjoy their negative freedom. On the other hand, 
republican freedom derives its meaning from the wish of individuals to become their 
own masters. In other words, the republican conception of freedom looks for the factors 
or external forces that direct individuals to make their choices in a particular way. In 
this respect, Berlin argues that liberal and positive conceptions of freedom are originally 
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not totally different from each other; but they have just developed in divergent 
directions.
197
 In this sense, Berlin‟s classification of positive and negative freedom 
looks very similar to Benjamin Constant‟s conceptualizations as “liberty of ancients” 
and “liberty of moderns.”198  
 Pettit argues that self-mastery and non-interference are not the same things. 
However, one can still develop a third alternative out of these definitions of liberty. 
Based on Berlin‟s two conceptions, he reconceptualizes liberty as “non-domination.” 
Although this conceptualization takes elements from Berlin‟s two conceptions of 
liberty, Pettit suggests that non-domination neither means self-mastery, nor non-
interference.
199
 To clarify what he means by these things, he gives two examples. First, 
he argues that domination does not mean interference because, for example, one can be 
a slave owned by a master, and dominated by her without being exposed to her 
interference. Hence, domination can take place without interference. Second, a person 
may not be a slave but he may be exposed to interference by others.
200
 On the other 
hand, liberty as non-domination avoids these possibilities, and he finds this “best 
alternative” in the classical republican tradition, which he studies through the texts of 
Skinner, Price, and Priestley, carrying him through history up to Machiavelli and 
Harrington.  
 Following the Cambridge School of thought, which defines republican liberty as 
non-domination, Viroli, by using the same method with the Cambridge School 
historians, looks for the meaning of patriotism in the ancient and early modern texts. His 
main objective with this task is to reveal that patriotism and nationalism are different 
attachments. Travelling into the pre-national state formation, he concludes that love of 
patria actually means love of the particular free way of life provided by the republic, 
since “patria and liberty part company.”201 However, although patriotism and 
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nationalism are different attachments, it is still a “formidable opponent” for nationalism 
because they compete on the same ground of passions and particularity, and with the 
same method, which is rhetoric.
202
   
III.II Viroli’s Patriotism: “Love of Liberty”  
Viroli in his For Love of Country criticizes the common opinion that patriotism 
and nationalism are similar and indistinguishable attachments. He seeks to distinguish 
these two concepts through a historical analysis of patriotism. Beyond this, he tries to 
bring “patriotism as an antidote to nationalism.203 In this two-fold argument, that 
patriotism is different from and an antidote to nationalism, lies the claim that  “love of 
country” and “loyalty to the nation” are two different attachments: whereas the former 
has been used for centuries in order to reinforce a love for political institutions in which 
citizens sustain their liberty, the latter came into being in the late eighteenth-century 
Europe to defend and strengthen the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic oneness and 
homogeneity of a people.
204
 However, this does not mean that the only concern of 
patriotism is the liberty that citizens enjoy in a republic while the only concern of 
nationalism is to protect the unity of a people; these are indeed common concerns of 
both patriotism and nationalism. The difference stands on which one gives priority over 
what. According to Viroli, the primary value of patriots is the liberty framed and 
provided by the republic, while nationalism emphasizes spiritual and cultural unity of a 
people.
205
 However, as I will discuss later, this difference set by Viroli oscillates 
between universalism and cultural belonging or attachment, and remains unclear.  
Although Viroli aims to read patriotism in the republican sense as a virtue rather 
than a vice, he on the other hand admits that love of country and civic action for the 
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common good can lead to dangerous outcomes as well. In other words, patriotic love 
and passion may not create a pursuit of life on the string of common liberty under the 
republic, but it may turn to a love of monarchy or an authoritarian regime.
206
 Hence, he 
underlines that people should find a way to decide the right love and passion for 
country, and choose the right common good to pursue.
207
 To do this, he suggests that 
we re-examine the works of republican political thinkers who describe love of country 
as love of common liberty and the institutions under which it is sustained.
208
 Out of a 
grasp of prominent thinkers of republicanism in the ancient and modern history, he 
defines patriotism as “a particularistic love, as it is love of the common liberty of a 
particular people, sustained by institutions that have a particular history which has for 
that people a particular meaning, or meanings, that inspire and are in turn sustained by a 
particular way of life and culture.”209 Since this love is particularistic, Viroli asserts, it 
by no means implies that it is exclusive; it can easily pass beyond national boundaries 
and translates into solidarity.
210
 The language of patriotism, which Viroli admits that it 
is weak when compared to the language of nationalism, should be patriotism of liberty 
and republic; if one wants to challenge the particularistic language of nationalism, for 
Viroli, we need another such language.
211
  
In his historical examination of modern patriotism, Viroli goes back to the 
ancients to find its legacy. He looks at Greek and Roman sources in which patriotism 
had religious and political meanings. In terms of religious understanding of ancient 
patriotism, love of country meant devotion to terra patria, land of the fathers, a sacred 
soil through which one finds its property, faith, security, and laws.
212
 Therefore, terra 
patria in the ancient Greece and Rome was of critical place in the construction of a 
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person‟s identity. It is the place where a person finds her Gods, faith, and culture. Since 
this form of patriotism has a strong religious aspect, it requires certain activities to show 
devotion. In this respect, it can hardly be explained by love in a passive sense but an 
unquestionable, strict and strong devotion to the soil through which a person identifies 
herself. As Viroli explains, she must “love it as she loves his religion, and obey it as she 
obeys his Gods. She must give herself to it entirely. It is a demanding love that admits 
no distinctions, no conditions.”213  
However, rather than dwelling on religious patriotism, and despite similarities 
and connections, Viroli concentrates on political patriotism, which he seeks to separate 
and distinguish from the religious one. Based on the texts of ancient Roman thinkers, 
such as Cicero, Sallust, Livy, Quintilian, and Augustine, he equates patria with 
respublica.
214
 He stresses that political patriotism – the love of patria – is a political 
virtue since the love that citizens establish with their country is a rational one.
215
 This 
form of patriotism gives us a feeling that if the country is corrupted, or if there are 
injustices in the country, the individual‟s life also gets impoverished. Therefore, what 
citizens ought to do is to fight against injustices and recover the good quality of life 
under the republic.
216
 This understanding of political and republican patriotism, which I 
call “patriotism of ancients,” is what Viroli aims to recover and bring into our times. He 
underlines that among many definitions and conceptualizations of patriotism, we must 
rely on the Roman republican notion that prioritize the common good as liberty under 
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the republic. Hence, his understanding of the common good is the liberty and 
institutions that foster republican freedom.  
Viroli‟s definition of republican patriotism, which emphasizes the love of liberty 
provided by a particular republic, can be read as a model of living together for a 
heterogeneous society sharing the same land. Unlike a liberal/cosmopolitan standpoint, 
republican patriotism, the one that Viroli describes, recognizes particularities such as 
religion, ethnicity, and culture, but it does not suggest allegiance or special affection to 
any of these pre-political identities. Instead, it suggests a political perspective by 
supporting a way of life in which freedom prevails.
217
 In this respect, it is also 
distinguished from nationalism since the language of republican patriotism does not 
take pre-political values as a reference point.
218
 In other words, whereas republican 
patriotism is a pre-national and political understanding of allegiance to a country, 
nationalism requires attachment to pre-political values.     
Viroli claims that we can observe in the intellectual context of the Italian city-
republics that the classical Roman understanding of patria was fully recovered, and it 
constituted the core of the modern republican language of patriotism.
219
 In the literary 
texts of the Italian writers, patria as a free city regains its moral and existential value.
220
 
However, it was in the works of Machiavelli that patriotism becomes “a kind of love 
that he would like to see flourishing in the hearts of his compatriots.”221 In this respect, 
Viroli reads Machiavelli‟s virtù as his patriotism, which means a republican sense of 
love of common liberty.
222
 Therefore, what Machiavelli means, when he says that a 
republic requires virtuous citizens, is that he wants to see compatriots serving with the 
sentiment of love, which is for the patria.  
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After Machiavelli, Viroli also examines the works of Rousseau. He argues that if 
we want to have a grasp of what Rousseau means by the concept of virtue, “we must 
remember that for him, too, patrie means above all else the common liberty.”223 
Through Rousseau‟s texts, such as Considerations on the Government of Poland, Social 
Contract, and Émile, he tries to find connections between love of country and love of 
liberty. To this end, he puts Rousseau‟s works into context by comparing the language 
that he uses with his contemporaries and the political events of his time. In this respect, 
Viroli suggests that Rousseau is a true citizen and a true patriot of Geneva, who gave up 
his citizenship; because he felt that the patrie he loved did not exist anymore.
224
 Indeed, 
Geneva was still there with its people, culture, language, laws and institutions; but as 
Viroli suggests, Rousseau left his country because there was no longer republic and 
liberty.
225
  
For Viroli, Rousseau was one of the last intellectuals talking about patriotism in 
its pre-national sense. After him, the language of patriotism started to be relegated by 
the language of nationalism, although it achieved to survive in the language of some 
intellectuals, and people who were seeking for rights and emancipation in their 
societies.
226
 Since republican patriotism has lost its eminence due to the strength of 
nationalist discourses, he then looks for how to bring back this old version of patriotism 
against nationalism in our day. He points out that there are good studies that historically 
and theoretically important in terms of reconstructing the language of patriotism without 
nationalism; but he suggests that “more work needs to be done; the search is 
unfinished.”227  
One of the examples that Viroli gives for these works is his “compatriot,” 
“Italian anti-fascist martyr,” Carlo Roselli. By reexamining Roselli‟s works, he comes 
to the conclusion that he clearly distinguishes patriotism from nationalism: “He 
identified the former with claims for liberty based on respect for the rights of other 
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peoples; the second with politics of aggrandizement pursued by reactionary regimes.”228 
Another example that he gives for a rediscovery and reworking of the language of 
patriotism is Simone Weil‟s L’Enracinement, which she wrote in 1943, while she was 
working for Free France in London. Viroli explains that Weil looked for the possibilities 
of a powerful reinterpretation of patriotism that would come to mean liberty and 
compassion with a cultural and spiritual rootedness, which is at the same time exempt 
from the language of nationalism, “turning love of country into blind identification of 
pride for the uniqueness of our own nation.”229   
Finally, Viroli asserts that one of the most significant contributions to his idea of 
reinstating the republican patriotism against nationalism is from Habermas‟s analysis of 
national identity and citizenship. Viroli explains that in Germany, nationalism prevailed 
over republican spirit and even turned into racism that justified the Holocaust. Until 
1945, the concept of nation referred to the unity and pure homogeneity of German 
people, which led to “the expulsion or confinement of the enemies of the people 
(Voksfremde): social democrats, Catholics, ethnic minorities, and then Jews, democratic 
radicals, the left, intellectuals, and so on.”230 Hence, against this conception of 
nationalism, Viroli remarks, Habermas comes up with“patriotism of the Constitution” 
(Verfassungspatriotismus), which ties patriotism or loyalty to “the universalistic 
political principles of liberty and democracy embodied in the constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Germany.”231  
Viroli states that Habermas separates his constitutional patriotism from 
republican tradition for he thinks that the intellectual tradition of republicanism derives 
from Aristotle that regards citizenship primarily in terms of “membership in a self-
governing ethical and cultural community.”232 Therefore, for Habermas, republicanism 
considers citizenship as integration of parts to the community to the extent that each 
individual can develop his personal and social identity only in these particular traditions 
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and political institutions; and thus, in highly pluralistic societies, this theory of 
citizenship cannot work and offer a ground for patriotism that would fit for national 
citizens.
233
 Nevertheless, Viroli claims that that Habermas finds the intellectual source 
of republicanism in Aristotle is a “gross historical error” he “probably” borrows from 
Charles Taylor, because modern republican theories of citizenship mostly appeals to 
Roman republican authors, rather than Aristotle.
234
 For the Roman thinkers, 
republicanism did not consider citizenship as integration to the ethical and cultural 
community, but obtaining and maintaining civil and political rights as a member of a 
republic; and republic is, after all, a political community that enables its citizens to live 
in justice and freedom.
235
  
On the other hand, according to Viroli, although Habermas does not identify 
himself as republican, and although he criticizes republicanism from his own but wrong 
standpoint, Viroli claims that because of this misunderstanding, Habermas is not aware 
that his constitutional patriotism is also a kind of republican patriotism: “Habermas‟s 
Verfassungspatriotismus does not break at all with republican tradition; it is instead a 
new version of it.”236 Moreover, with a “one singular clearly identifiable” definition of 
republicanism in mind,
237
 Viroli does not seem to consider Charles Taylor as 
republican; but he thinks that Habermas is a republican thinker.
238
 Hence, he suggests 
that beyond all the shortcomings of Habermas‟s theory of constitutional patriotism, it is 
a version of republican patriotism, albeit unknowingly. But he also claims that 
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Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism should put more emphasis on stronger ties with 
particular history and culture, and thus, with a particular identity – but with a hoarse 
voice to avoid a loss of political liberty – because without these particular values, 
“universal political principles cannot live and survive.”239  
III.III Conclusion: Love of Liberty 
 Viroli‟s definition of republican patriotism as “love of liberty” draws from a 
contextualist method introduced by the Cambridge School historians. He applies the 
same method to regenerate the idea of patriotism as a model for today‟s world, which 
therefore sounds archaic and in some respects anachronistic. To this end, he returns to 
the patriotic sentences of the classical and modern republican tradition, particularly of 
Livy, Cicero, Machiavelli, and Rousseau. He also compares these texts with political 
events and contemporaries of these thinkers. Reinforced by the works of the Cambridge 
School, he reinterprets classical and modern republican thinkers in such a way that their 
conceptualizations of patriotism can be revitalized and brought to this time.  
Engaging in a struggle with the language of nationalism, Viroli seeks to suggest 
a coherent form of patriotism with as strong discourse as nationalism, and sources of 
which come from a pre-national context. He believes that patriotism written in the texts 
of modern republicanism can be the best alternative for nationalism, which societies 
must overcome. For him, republican patriotic discourse can do it because both 
nationalism and patriotism use the same method to “construct” a society, which is 
rhetoric, against purely rational arguments. Although nationalism and patriotism use 
two different languages, they use the same method. Besides, patriotism also tries to 
create bonds of solidarity, and it does not have any claim for universality: “It does not 
say to the Italians or the Germans who want to remain Italian or German, that they 
should think and act as citizens of the world, or lovers of an anonymous liberty and 
justice; it tells them that they should become Italian and German citizens committed to 
defend and improve their own republic, and to live freely in their own way, and it says 
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so by using poignant images that refer to shared memories and by telling meaningful 
stories that give color and warmth to the ideal of the republic.”240  
These words of Viroli easily catch the eyes of some scholars due to its similar 
sounds with tamed versions of nationalism. Viroli‟s patriotism is selective in the sense 
that it tells citizens the kind and strength of the feelings that they should bear for their 
country. Citizens should love their country because it is their own country, in which 
they live freely; but not only for liberty that they enjoy in their particular country, 
should they also feel attachment to their culture and history, though without 
exaggerating this feeling.  These ambivalent suggestions of Viroli raise critiques from 
some scholars who argue that Viroli‟s conceptualization of patriotism only seems to 
suggest a tamed version of nationalism;
241
 and he puts too much trust on the republican 
thinkers in terms of their so-called emphasis on liberty.
242
  
In order to clarify what he means by republican patriotism, Viroli turns to 
Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism. As I have written above, according to him, 
constitutional patriotism is a version of republican patriotism; and Habermas is a 
republican thinker, though he does not know it. Departing from this point, in the next 
chapter, I will dwell on the concept of constitutional patriotism in order to verify my 
argument that indeed, Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism is not only different but also 
against republican patriotism. To this end, I will first look at where Habermas originates 
his conceptualization. Then, I will briefly examine the contemporary debates of the 
concept, together with its development in the constitutional debates of Germany. 
Finally, I will set down the differences between Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism 
and Viroli‟s republican patriotism.    
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CHAPTER 3: ON CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM 
 
IV.I. Hegel: “Good Citizen” versus “Good Laws” 
 Hegel, the nineteenth century philosopher, is one of the most important but often 
neglected figures opening the way for Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism. Although 
Habermas criticizes Hegel for various reasons, he is also influenced by him. He finds 
the solution to the problem of mutual existence of “right” and “good” in Hegel‟s 
political philosophy, which Hegel discusses as a critique of Kant, which he finds too 
individualist, and Rousseau, who sounds too communitarian. Hence, Habermas argues 
that Hegel is the first philosopher who pointed out that we misunderstand the basic 
moral phenomenon whose task is to solve the tension between the principles of justice 
and solidarity.
243
 Hegel argues that the right of individuals in terms of their self-
determination can be fulfilled only if they belong to ethical actuality, which is the state 
with good laws.
244
 Here, Hegel makes a critique of Rousseau, who aims to construct 
“good citizens” by giving them pedagogical training and indoctrinate them with “civil 
religion.” Hegel asserts that “those pedagogical experiments in removing people from 
the ordinary life of the present and bringing them up in the country have been futile, 
because one cannot successfully isolate people from the laws of the world.”245 Hence, 
he suggests that instead of making good citizens, they must be made citizens of “a state 
with good laws.”246 Only in this state, individuals can maintain their rights by becoming 
a citizen.  
 On the other hand, since they are citizens, they also have duties. For Hegel, it is 
a natural outcome of being a free citizen: “The slave can have no duties; only the free 
human being has these.”247 Therefore, right and duty merges in the identity of the 
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universal in the ethical life, since “a human being has rights in so far as he has duties, 
and duties in so far as he has rights.”248 Thus, ethical life [Sittlichkeit] is the realm of 
citizens where individuals gain subjective freedom in the state. It is also the idea of 
freedom, knowledge and volition of which can be attained through self-
consciousness.
249
 In this respect, Hegel distances himself from the social contractarians 
as well. He thinks that freedom is not something given to individuals; it has to be 
mediated.
250
 And self-consciousness is gained in the historical process through 
individuals‟ interaction with the world.251  
By placing self-consciousness into a historical process, he gives history a 
teleological meaning. In this process, subjectivity and naturalness of people are 
educated so that people gain formal freedom and formal universality of knowledge.
252
 
Here, one of the most important concepts of Hegel comes into picture, which is Bildung. 
Bildung is a process of maturation through education and culture.
253
 According to 
Hegel, this education is also liberation and work towards a higher liberation, because 
through education, subjectivity and our immediate desires pass beyond its immediate 
and natural form to take the shape of universality.
254
 He suggests that it is a training of 
individuals to render them ethical by giving them a second (spiritual) nature, and 
making this nature habitual
255: “it is the absolute transition to the infinitely subjective 
substantiality of ethical life.”256  
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Although Bildung looks like Rousseau‟s pedagogical training to make “virtuous 
citizens” by teaching them to unite their wills with the general will, in fact, the purpose 
of Hegel‟s education is to make truly original citizens having subjective freedom. It 
aims to educate people to make their conducts in harmony with their will: “True 
originality, by which the [universal] thing is produced, requires true education, whereas 
false originality assumes tasteless forms which occur only to the uneducated.”257 Hence, 
Bildung can be considered as a training of individuals to teach them how to use their 
reason to control their immediate desires.   
In short, ethical life is the realm that individuals gain self-consciousness, as well 
as the consciousness that their concrete freedom can be actualized through personal 
knowledge and volition.
258
 As I have examined above, in the ethical life, people merge 
their rights with duties to others because they can only actualize their right as a citizen 
of a state with good laws. In this respect, according to Habermas, it is an implicit 
criticism of Hegel to those who consider justice and solidarity in an isolated way.
259
 It is 
also the starting point of Habermas‟s “discourse ethics,” which replaces the famous 
categorical imperative of Kant, the a priori universal-moral principles valid for all 
humanity, by a procedure of moral argumentation.
260
  
 According to Habermas‟s discourse ethics, individuals develop their identities 
only through socialization (individuation through socialization). Mostly based on the 
theory of Mead and Hegel, he explains that individuation through socialization makes 
personal identities fragile and insecure, that is, this kind of identity formation requires 
mutual recognition. Therefore, individuals cannot create their identities when they live 
separately from their society; they are dependent on interpersonal relationships. Thus, 
they linguistically and behaviorally need to socialize with others to construct an 
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intersubjectively shared lifeworld; and through communication with each other, 
individuals establish the lifeworld of a language community.
261
  
 Since individuation through socialization makes people vulnerable, morality is 
appropriated to solve two tasks at once: 1) it emphasizes the inviolability of individuals 
establishing a rule for equal respect for human dignity; and 2) it must also secure the 
grounds for intersubjective relations, through which individuals gain mutual 
recognition.
262
 In this respect, whereas the former signifies justice, the latter underlines 
the principle of solidarity, which means “the well-being of associated members of a 
community who intersubjectively share the same lifeworld.”263  
 Therefore, discourse ethics undermines Kantian categorical imperative for 
universal morality, and brings a procedure of moral argumentation in which individuals 
engage in communicative action without any inside or outside coercion, except “the 
force of the better argument.”264 His discourse ethics, which is a rule for engaging in 
argumentation with others, requires universal pragmatics, that is, individuals engaging 
in argumentation must have competences and skills to be able to communicate.
265
 Under 
these circumstances, he identifies three levels of rules of discourse: 1) every subject 
who has competence is allowed to take part in the discourse; 2) everyone is allowed to 
ask questions, make claims, and express attitudes; and 3) nobody is prevented by 
internal and external coercion except the force of the better argument.
266
  
IV.II. Hegel’s Rational Patriotism 
 Bernstein is one of the first thinkers diagnosing a connection between Hegel‟s 
patriotism and Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism. He points out that the notion of 
political identity presented in Hegel‟s The Philosophy of Right is encapsulated by the 
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notion of constitutional patriotism, which is adopted by Habermas.
267
 However, he does 
not explain in what respects Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism and that of Hegel 
overlap; he “terminates” his argument “in an aporia.”268 In fact, a careful reading of 
Hegel‟s patriotism can easily reveal that at least his conceptualization is a clear break 
with the republican tradition. Moving from this point, one can also find continuity 
between Hegel‟s patriotism and Habermas‟s.  
 Firstly, Hegel‟s patriotism is a person‟s subjective substantiality, which is her 
political disposition, based on truth and a volition that has become habitual.
269
 This 
political disposition is mostly about trust or consciousness that citizens‟ interests are 
preserved in the interest and end of the state.
270
 In this respect, it can clearly be noticed 
that Hegel does not link patriotism with sentiments of love and passions, but to 
habituation, volition, and reason. Therefore, what he presents as patriotism is rather a 
synthesis of desire and reason. As I will examine below, Habermas also does not think 
that patriotism as a sentiment is an appropriate form of attachment, since it easily takes 
us to pre-political allegiances. In this sense, Habermas is following Hegel by grounding 
his constitutional patriotism in political terms rather than sentiments.  
 Secondly, Hegel thinks that political disposition must be based on concrete 
institutions rather than to an imagined or abstract notion. In this respect, he emphasizes 
that the objective reality of political disposition is the political constitution.
271
 Similarly, 
Habermas asserts that patriotism should develop around the constitution, which reflects 
the political culture of a given society.
272
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V. Habermas: A Citizen-Philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas is one of the most influential intellectuals of the twentieth 
century. Having grown up during the Nazi period, he has developed political and social 
theories that were partly shaped by the events of his childhood. His academic life started 
when he became the research assistant of Theodor Adorno at the Frankfurt School. At 
the Frankfurt School, he was influenced by various scholars. Among them, for example, 
Plessner, taught him how to be a part of German culture and traditions while keeping a 
certain distance from them with a self-critical spirit.
273
 Therefore, keeping his critical 
distance, he could associate himself with the society he lives, as well as the global 
public sphere through his critiques toward his own society and citizens of the world; and 
for the very reason that he is considered “a citizen-philosopher.”274  
Throughout his academic life in Frankfurt School and elsewhere, he became one 
of the most widely read philosophers of his time. Although he was taught in the 
Frankfurt School, he also became one of the strongest critiques of it. Habermas 
criticizes that the pessimistic views of Adorno and Horkheimer, the leading scholars of 
the Frankfurt School in the 1950s, on the project of modernity make them unable to 
differentiate between the pathologies of modernity and gains from it.
275
 Therefore, he 
believes that we still have to look into the Enlightenment project of modernity, for 
which Critical Theory can be used in order to uncover this ambivalent structure within 
it. To this end, he aims to reinstate the philosophy of Kant, who was largely neglected 
by the Frankfurt Scholars.
276
 In this respect, while he maintains his critical stand against 
liberalism; based on Kant‟s cosmopolitanism, he suggests that we make a constitution 
out of international law together with normative cosmopolitan principles, previously 
proposed by Kant.  
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In this paper, my intention is not to examine Habermas‟s political and social 
philosophy at length: rather, I will limit my discussion to his theory of constitutional 
patriotism. In this respect, I will start with a question: how does Habermas construct 
constitutional patriotism, which is supposed to provide a particular attachment together 
with a universal claim? In order to give an answer to this question, I will focus on his 
“co-originality thesis” in which he argues that liberal claims of human rights and 
republican claims to popular sovereignty are not mutually exclusive. They are equally 
original but they complement each other; “one is not possible without the other, but 
neither sets limits on the other.”277 Then, I will continue with his idea of deliberative 
politics, which is different but still based on republican and liberal models.
278
  
According to Habermas, pre-political attachments are no longer sufficient for 
political legitimation. After the French Revolution, nationalism became a very good 
source for the establishment of liberal democratic nation-states but the present situation 
reveals that nation-states cannot solve the problems posed by the global trade, 
communication, economic production, spread of technology and weapons, and 
ecological and military risks.
279
 He also argues that in today‟s more and more globalized 
world, we can no longer rely on the uniting force of ethnically based notion of 
citizenship; instead we suffer from a normative deficit of it.
280
 Therefore, he suggests 
that we find a way to establish a system in which citizens from various backgrounds 
will be able to communicate, and deliberate for democratic opinion and will-formation, 
which will be reflected in the procedural principles of constitution. Only in this way, 
“diverse forms of life can coexist equally” and it can be open to “impulses from new 
forms of life.”281 In this respect, constitutional patriotism, which is suggested by 
Habermas, is an alternative solution to the question of “how to live together.”  
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This question finds several responses from different camps, such as liberals, 
communitarians, and republicans. Habermas‟s response, however, does not depend 
entirely on any of these camps; it takes elements from them. He suggests that citizens‟ 
attachment should not be based on a particular nation, but a constitution which 
underlines popular sovereignty and human rights.
282
 In this sense, Kadıoğlu describes 
Habermas‟ account of constitutional patriotism and constitutional citizenship as an 
attempt to break the ties between political attachment and nation. She points out that 
Habermas was seeking to find a new ground for citizenship in Germany, and to this end, 
he brought the idea of “constitutional citizens” instead of “national citizens.”283 
Constitutional patriotism in this approach serves as an umbrella term under which 
peoples from different origins and identities live together without being subjected to any 
particularistic discrimination in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion, or race. Yet, the 
concept of constitutional patriotism was not originally invented by Jürgen Habermas; he 
reintroduced the concept with his own terms into the current citizenship debates. 
Therefore, in the next part, I will explain how this concept came into being and being 
discussed by Habermas and others.  
V.I. Development of Constitutional Patriotism 
At first sight, the concept of constitutional patriotism sounds like an oxymoron 
which seeks to bring universality and particularity together. In this respect, Göztepe 
argues that it does not have any meaning either in semantics or in the terminology of 
law.
284
 She states that this concept was produced during citizenship debates in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in the name of “Verfassungspatriotismus.”285 After the 
Second World War, people in the Federal Republic of Germany were very hesitant to 
mention about nationalism, which is the most powerful unifying ideology of the modern 
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era. Hence, in the 1960s, scholarly debates were centered on the questions of how to 
keep the German state together, and how to establish institutions that would give people 
a sense of belonging to a political system. It was during these debates that a liberal-
conservative jurist, Dolf Sternberger, for the first time, came up with the concept of 
“Verfassungspatriotismus” as an alternative to the destructive power of German 
nationalism.
286
 Drawing highly on Karl Jaspers, who called “the true German as world 
citizen,” Sternberger introduced the concept of Staatsfreundschaft, which means 
friendship towards the state, to create “a patriotic sentiment in the constitutional 
state.”287 Finally, on the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1979, he suggested “constitutional patriotism” as the true form 
of attachment that would tie the German community together, and make them loyal to 
the democratic state.
288
  
However, although this concept was brought into the literature by Sternberger, it 
was not created by him. Milfull explains that since 1949, the citizens of the Federal 
Republic of Germany have been required by law to be “constitutional patriots,” which 
implies that people must be loyal to the constitution rather than the state.
289
 Therefore, 
constitutional patriotism was the concept used by the Federal Republic of Germany to 
hold its citizens together without the ideology of nationalism. It assumed that citizens, 
as the authors and addressees of the laws they create, must be loyal to the constitution, 
and protect the values that their constitution represented.
290
 Hence, constitutional 
patriotism of the post-war era was, at first, particular for the citizens of West Germany. 
It was not a universalist response to nationalism; it was only created as a form of 
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political attachment, and a “supplement for particularity.”291 The most prominent 
thinker and defender of this particular constitutional patriotism was Dolf Sternberger. 
Müller explains that Sternberger‟s idea of constitutional patriotism was based on 
Aristotelianism, Hannah Arendt‟s republicanism, and a civic engagement based on 
reciprocity.
292
 Although the history of patriotism is generally traced back to the Ancient 
Roman tradition, Sternberger stretches it back to Aristotelian writings, which do not link 
patriotism with nation but love of laws and liberties.
293
 It is because of this fact that 
current conceptions of constitutional patriotism are generally considered as a return to 
pre-national republicanism, which I will discuss later.
294
 However, although 
Sternberger‟s account of constitutional patriotism claims to be different from 
nationalism, Göztepe argues that his understanding of “allegiance to constitution” fails 
to go beyond the assumption of one homogenous culture, and one German nation.
295
 
Therefore, Sternberger‟s constitutional patriotism does not bring a cure for the problems 
of the twentieth century, that is, it does not help to develop a project or model for 
creating a political unity in which peoples live together.
296
 Hence, although he sought to 
transcend the nation-state, his account of constitutional patriotism was heavily based on 
German statism.
297
  
Sternberger‟s description of constitutional patriotism is thus unable to eliminate 
particularistic notions of allegiance; it does not even aim to do so. He was mostly trying 
to eliminate those who are against the German constitution, and to avoid all forms of 
extremism within the country. Müller argues that what Sternberger suggests is a 
“protective constitutional patriotism” which draws a line between “friends and 
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enemies.”298 Protective type of constitutional patriotism was designed to fight against 
internal and external enemies through, if necessary, anti-democratic or authoritarian 
measures. In this sense, Müller explains that protective constitutional patriotism was 
associated with “militant democracy,”299 which puts “anti-democratic measures” to 
preserve the functioning of a democratic state.
300
 Therefore, constitutional patriotism in 
the Federal Germany was an effort to destroy fascist movements in the country; and to 
prevent communist movements from leaking into the country. In this respect, banning of 
the Nazi Socialist Reich Party and the Communist Party in the 1950s are good examples 
which could be justified by protective constitutional patriotism of German “militant 
democracy.”301  
However, although this form of constitutional patriotism seems to have some 
negative aspects that I have discussed, it does have a very important merit. 
Constitutional patriotism in the Federal Republic of Germany merely aimed at 
preventing the rising of ethnic nationalism. Therefore, constitutional patriotism can also 
be regarded as a different projection of an idea of “good life.” It is much more inclusive 
and tolerant than ethnic nationalism. Moreover, it does not root the sense of belonging 
and allegiance to a particular culture, but to the liberal democratic constitution. It stands 
against the belief that one is born with a nationality and with certain characteristics of a 
particular nation; and instead, it brings the idea that one “chooses” to live within a 
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political community by her rational consent. It is in this respect that some scholars 
consider constitutional patriotism as a civic understanding of a national community.
302
  
Conceptualizing civic nationalism is an effort by contemporary liberals, who 
seek to distinguish between ethnos and demos. They look for possible ways to channel 
national sentiments in a direction that is more inclusive, open to “others” and respectful 
to individual rights.
303
 Unlike ethnic nationalism, which considers identity and culture 
as given and inherited, civic nationalism underlines that they are rather chosen.
304
 This 
ethnic/civic dichotomy is most commonly studied by comparing Germany, Japan, and 
most East European countries, which are labeled as bearing ethnic understanding of 
citizenship, with France, the United States, and Canada, whose perception of citizenship 
addresses more of a civic definition. In that respect, Habermas‟s constitutional 
patriotism is thought as just another way of saying “civic nationalism.” 
Although constitutional patriotism seems to have similarities with civic 
nationalism, one should also separate these concepts from each other. It is true that 
similar to civic nationalism, constitutional patriotism is also created to avoid the rise of 
ethnic nationalism, but it does not render this concept a member of civic nationalism. 
Behind Habermas‟s theory of constitutional patriotism, there is his conception of “post-
conventional identities” that he draws from Kohlberg. According to Kohlberg‟s 
psychological models of post-conventional identities, individuals learn to adopt an 
impartial stand against their own desires and conventional social expectations through 
which institutions of society confront them.
305
 In this way, individuals can compare and 
synthesize their desires and society‟s demands from them through wider moral 
considerations, and thus, identity becomes “de-centered.”306  
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Habermas applies Kohlberg‟s individual level analysis to the level of society. He 
points out that legitimacy, or the exercise of coercion on citizens, cannot be justified 
through sacred or quasi-sacred sources, such as religion or nation any more.
307
 In this 
picture, “conventional morality,”308 such as religion, tradition, and “family values,” is 
reinterpreted under the guidance of universal moral principles that find expression as 
civil rights and constitutional norms.
309
 Hence, in this account, “unconditional, or even 
unreflective, identification is then supposed to be replaced by dynamic and complex 
processes of identity-formation ─ that is, by open-ended political and legal learning 
processes.”310 This requires a web of communication processes, and for this reason, 
Habermas addresses public sphere as the ultimate ground for developing collective 
identities.
311
 Therefore, unlike civic nationalism, Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism is 
established upon this post-conventional community.     
Since the concept of constitutional patriotism, which was developed after the 
Second World War, has certain features that reject pre-political, ethnic identity, 
Habermas reintroduces this concept in order to provide a solution for ethnic conflicts 
that took place especially in the Balkan Peninsula after the Cold War. He also used this 
concept to provide political legitimacy for German reunification and the supranational 
political entities, such as the European Union; and to suggest a solution for the 
“problem”312 of mass migration from countries outside Europe. Yet, his conception of 
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constitutional patriotism is very different from his precedents. He explains, in The 
Postnational Constellation, that nation-states have lost their claim of full legitimacy on 
their territories, and they are historically outdated. Thus, there is a need for imagining 
post-traditional and post-national societies under such political systems that are 
legitimated by supranational political institutions.
313
 For this reason, his projection of 
constitutional patriotism serves as “glue” that can create solidarity among people even 
under a supranational authority beyond nation-states. As the most prominent thinker on 
this topic, it is necessary to dwell on his conception of constitutional patriotism in a 
more detailed way. To put it simply, his theory of constitutional patriotism consists of 
morality and universality, historicity, pragmatism, democratic procedures and juridical 
principles, and popular sovereignty.  
V.II Habermas’s Constitutional Patriotism 
In The Postnational Constellation, Habermas explains the development of 
nation-state and its limits from a historical perspective. He suggests that the emergence 
of the territorial state by the seventeenth century superseded the city-states because of 
its better definition of sovereignty over a specific territory.
314
 This form of state later 
turned into the modern state which is a tax-based and administrative state with a 
capitalist economy. In the nineteenth century, the administrative state, as a modern 
nation-state, began to implement democratic forms of legitimation; this modern-nation 
state was, in the beginning, very successful in regulating the market economy without 
much interference, but it led to the development of global economy which is now not 
under the influence of nation-states.
315
 Therefore, this loss of power of nation-states 
comes in the name of globalization. Thus, it is important to examine how, for 
Habermas, globalization affects the nature of nation-states.  
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Habermas argues that democratization of nation-states took place in four steps: 
1) birth of administrative and tax based state, 2) birth of territorial state, 3) birth of 
nation-state, and 4) birth of democratic and social welfare state. Then, it was followed 
by the rapid process of globalization.
316
 However, the globalization phase, which geared 
up after the 1970s, does not mean the end of nation-states but a continuing process 
through which technology and means of communication gave birth to a network of 
dense relationships.
317
 The most important dimension of this process is the globalization 
of economy which Habermas calls “denationalization of economic production.”318 In 
this respect, he argues that globalization is a world-wide development which is 
independent from nation-states but has a direct and negative impact on the power and 
legitimacy of nation-states.
319
 He explains that the process of globalization undermine 
the conventional and traditional forms of identities. Therefore, it is a historical 
development that societies start to construct post-national and post-traditional identities. 
Therefore, development of post-national societies is not a coincidence but a historical 
process. In this respect, Habermas uses Hegel as a reference, who argues that every 
historical formation is destined to decline when it reaches maturity.
320
  
Cavallar focuses on the pragmatic arguments of Habermas for the creation of 
post-national societies with the notion of constitutional patriotism.
321
 He explains that 
Habermas‟s pragmatic argument is based on three developments in Europe: national 
conflicts, a new mass migration that reinforces the support for universal democratic and 
juridical principles, and European integration.
322
 These developments are beyond the 
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control of nation-states and therefore, we need post-national political communities in 
which people have allegiance only to the liberal democratic constitution that they have 
created or given consent. In this respect, Habermas reveals his divergence from other 
theorists on constitutional patriotism that he tried to find a solution for the crises of 
political legitimacy and representation in nation-states by bringing up the principle of 
“loyalty to the constitution” beyond nation-states and inclusive of all multicultural 
societies.
323
  
For Habermas, the principle of “loyalty to the constitution,” rather than the state, 
nation or administration brings about “abstract” patriotism since it concentrates on the 
abstract democratic procedures and juridical principles.
324
 Therefore, Habermas 
describes constitutional patriotism as the proper attitude of citizens in a democratic state 
under rightful laws.
325
 In other words, democracy and laws, together with popular 
sovereignty, constitute Habermas‟s theory of constitutional patriotism. In this sense, 
popular sovereignty does not serve as a “principle” but a procedure of self-legislation 
that he takes from Rousseau and Kant. For this reason, Cavallar calls his theory of 
constitutional patriotism “procedural patriotism,” Verfahrenspatriotismus.326 What is 
more important in his theory is that Habermas does not exclude universal concepts, such 
as human rights. He suggests that universal moral principles, which are based on 
Western liberal traditions,
327
 are the only grounds for the harmonization of national 
cultures; these principles are based on the Western liberal traditions.
328
 However, it is 
misleading to suggest that Habermas‟s cosmopolitanism relies solely on the Western 
tradition. On the contrary, Habermas seeks to reinstate the Kantian ideas of “perpetual 
peace” and “world citizenship” against a hegemonic liberalism, which is today headed 
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by the ideologues of the United States that impose a new liberal world order, named 
“Pax Americana.”329 Hence, against a world order of liberal states, Habermas suggests a 
world society based on rule of law.
330
 Thus, as Müller suggests, Habermas brings a 
stronger universalist element to Sternberger‟s conception of constitutional patriotism.331  
Habermas‟s theory of constitutional patriotism is not only an alternative form of 
allegiance in the Western Germany or Germany after reunification, but for him, it can 
also be a project for the European Union. In his theory, he was obviously trying to 
transcend national citizenship or the idea of belonging to nation-state. Moreover, it was 
not limited to the boundaries of the European Union. His main object with 
constitutional patriotism is to form a “decentered world society” with effective 
institutions in which democratic opinion and will-formation could achieve a binding 
rule that is beyond nation-states.
332
 In this respect, Canovan names Habermas‟ theory as 
“cosmopolitan constitutional patriotism” due to its vision of a new form of allegiance to 
a supranational polity.
333
 Canovan argues that Habermas‟s theory of constitutional 
patriotism can be regarded as “new patriotism” since it is distinct from the traditional 
republican patriotism that she calls “rooted republicanism.”334 Therefore, in the next 
part, I shall endeavor to explain the differences between republican patriotism and 
constitutional patriotism. In this part, I will lead a discussion against Viroli‟s argument 
that constitutional patriotism is a version of republican patriotism. In so doing, I will try 
to prove my argument that constitutional patriotism is not only different, but also 
against republican patriotism.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
 
VI. Constitutional Patriotism versus Republican Patriotism 
In this thesis, I aimed to point out that there is a tension between republican 
patriotism and constitutional patriotism, which is often neglected. Standing against 
Viroli‟s assumption that constitutional patriotism is a version of republican patriotism, I 
sought to set down in what respects these two conceptualizations differ from each other. 
To this end, I gave a short genealogy of republican patriotism through the works of 
Machiavelli and Rousseau, who are also the sources of Viroli while he claims that love 
of patria is love of liberty. After that, I analyzed how Viroli constructs his 
understanding of patriotism. Then, I turned to the origins of constitutional patriotism to 
reveal that their origins are not the same. Moreover, I analyzed Habermas‟s 
conceptualization of constitutional patriotism. Finally, I concluded with the main points 
that constitutional and republican patriotisms differ from each other.  
Maurizio Viroli, through his writings on Rousseau and Machiavelli with the 
method of contextualism, has become one of the most prominent thinkers of 
republicanism and republican patriotism. His significance within the debates on 
contemporary republicanism is due to his search for a republican patriotism that can be 
an antidote and an alternative to nationalism in the modern world. As I have mentioned 
above, he mainly builds his theory on Philip Pettit‟s theory of republicanism, which 
identifies republicanism with “freedom as non-domination.”335 According to Viroli, this 
freedom can only be protected by patriotism.
336
 Although Viroli traces the history of 
patriotism back to the Roman Republic, he mainly draws on Machiavelli and Rousseau.  
Viroli points out that Roman Republican tradition of patriotism has lost its 
meaning or significance in the Medieval Era, but during Renaissance in the republican 
cities of Italy, patria reappeared as a political virtue.
337
 In this time, love of patria as a 
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political virtue was a “rational” love for the free city; it was rational in the sense that 
people were conscious of what they had and they wanted to protect it.
338
 However, after 
the sixteenth century, the ancient understanding of patriotism, love of republic and 
common liberty, lost its meaning and it came to mean loyalty to the state or monarch.
339
 
In the eighteenth century, patriotism regained its meaning against the politics of states, 
kings and princes; patria again meant respublica in which people live together under 
the laws that they created.
340
  
Although Viroli mentions about “patriotism without nationalism” for the modern 
nation-states, he fails to give a comprehensive analysis of the differences between this 
type of patriotism and nationalism. As Canovan suggests, Viroli tries to separate 
patriotism from nationalism, but he does it only through Habermas‟ theory of 
constitutional patriotism.
341
 On the other hand, he places constitutional patriotism under 
the umbrella of republican patriotism; and claims that constitutional patriotism is a 
version of republican patriotism.
342
 However, there are significant differences between 
republican patriotism and constitutional patriotism.  
Tunçel explains that Viroli‟s republican patriotism is specific for particular 
republics and their particular citizens.
343
 She precisely reveals that Viroli‟s theory of 
republican patriotism is particularistic because it assumes that this love of country 
requires loyalty to the institutions of republic and the way of life in a particular 
country.
344
 Moreover, Viroli‟s patriotism includes certain duties that citizens should 
carry out for the country, since he claims that citizens morally owe their countries their 
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lives, education, language, and more importantly, their freedoms.
345
 Therefore, 
republican patriotism is based on the idea that there must be a strong sense of 
attachment that would keep citizens together; otherwise they would not perform their 
duties for their country.  
Apart from differences, Tunçel also gives some similarities between republican 
and constitutional patriotism which can become more crystallized if one compares them 
together with nationalism. She explains that both republican and constitutional 
patriotism avoids xenophobia and chauvinist nationalism.
346
 In this sense, they reject 
ethnic nationalism, albeit not necessarily for the same reasons. Moreover, both types of 
patriotisms are associated with civic nationalism for some scholars. In this respect, Yack 
assumes that Habermas‟ defense of constitutional patriotism is largely a civic 
description of German reunification.
347
 Similarly, Calhoun suggests that the theory of 
constitutional patriotism proposed by Habermas is basically an idealization of “civic 
nationalism” model, since there is a tacit “natural” notion of nation which is always 
there.
348
 However, these comparisons are far from careful analysis. Tunçel makes some 
criticisms of republican patriotism but she ignores the fact that constitutional patriotism 
is a different concept. Moreover, other scholars associating constitutional patriotism 
with various forms of nationalism also fall short of clarity. Since my intention in this 
thesis does not include such a comparison, I will leave that discussion here; a coherent 
and analytical distinction between them goes way beyond the purposes of this thesis. On 
the other hand, for the purposes of this thesis, it is important to clarify the main tensions 
between constitutional and republican patriotisms.  
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Republican Patriotism Constitutional Patriotism 
Pre-national form of citizenship Post-national citizenship 
Machiavelli, Rousseau Hegel, Kant 
Sentiments Rational 
Love, passion Reason 
Conventional community Postconventional community 
Pride  Self-critical 
 
Viroli reconstructs a republican patriotism on the basis of Machiavelli and 
Rousseau. He uses the method of contextualism, which was introduced by the prominent 
historians of the Cambridge School, and reexamines the texts of these philosophers 
within a political and historical context. Then, he comes to the conclusion that both 
Machiavelli and Rousseau equate love of patria with love of liberty. Based on this 
assumption, he also claims that if we understand love of country as love of liberty, we 
can apply this old tradition to nation-states as well. In this way, he assumes that 
nationalism can be replaced with a more inclusive but equally strong attachment. For 
Viroli, it is possible because although nationalism and patriotism use different 
languages, at least they use the same method to convey their discourses. In this respect, 
he suggests rhetoric to fight against nationalist discourses.  
On the other hand, looking back into Habermas‟s sources of inspirations, as I 
have written, one can find out that he does not establish his theory on the philosophy of 
Machiavelli or Rousseau, but Hegel and Kant. Again based on this difference, we can 
also see that whereas Rousseau‟s and Machiavelli‟s patriotisms involve deep emotions 
and a love of patria, Hegel‟s and Habermas‟s constitutional patriotisms have a claim to 
purely rational political dispositions. Whereas the former loves its country because of 
the traditions, cultures and history through which citizens grow up, Hegel and Habermas 
underline individuation through socialization which will create mutual recognition as 
well as respect.  
Viroli aims to replace nationalism with a pre-national understanding of 
patriotism. However, Habermas‟s constitutional patriotism is based on a post-national 
attachment. In this sense, whereas Viroli‟s patriotism is rooted in a specific culture and 
history, and thus imagines a conventional community, Habermas suggests a post-
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conventional community and communication structures. Moreover, since Viroli‟s 
patriotism has deep cultural and historical roots, it does not tell people to distance 
themselves from their past to keep a critical eye on their history. In a sense, this form of 
patriotism requires a sense of pride for the history of a particular community. On the 
other hand, Habermas, as a philosopher-citizen, suggests that citizens be able to stand 
self-critical about their past.  
 To conclude, although Viroli asserts that constitutional patriotism is in the same 
family with republican patriotism, as I have tried to analyze, these two concepts have 
very different grounds, features, and components. However, it by no means imply that 
Viroli is totally wrong in his assumption. Certainly, constitutional patriotism and 
republican patriotism have family resemblance, that is, they both come from republican 
tradition, albeit based on different philosophers, and they are both alternative models of 
living together. These concepts are also created for the purpose of overcoming the 
dangers of nationalist discourses. It is the reason for all comparisons between these two 
forms of patriotisms with various forms of nationalism. On the other hand, due to too 
much focus on the possible differences and similarities between constitutional 
patriotism, republican patriotism, and nationalism, scholars have so far neglected the 
possible tensions between these two patriotisms. In this thesis, instead of studying 
patriotism with nationalism, I tried to concentrate on the tension between republican and 
constitutional patriotism. Therefore, I also hope that this thesis will lead to further 
investigations and debates between these two different patriotisms of Viroli and 
Habermas.  
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Berlin, Isaiah (2008). Kirpi ile tilki : seçme makaleler  (M. Tunçay and Z. Mertoğlu, 
Trans.). Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi.  
 
Bernstein, J. M. (2001). Constitutional Patriotism and the Problem of Violence. The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39(1), pp. 97 – 109.  
 
Black, Robert (1993). Machiavelli, servant of the Florentine republic. In Gisela Bock, 
Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (eds.), Machiavelli and Republicanism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 71 – 100.  
 
Calhoun, Craig (2007). Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream. 
London: Routledge.   
 
Canovan, Margaret (2000). Patriotism Is Not Enough. Political Theory, 30(3), pp. 413 – 
432.  
 
Cavallar, Georg (1999). Kant and the theory and practice of international right. Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press. 
 
Cochrane, Eric W. (1961). Machiavelli: 1940-1960. The Journal of Modern History, 
33(2), pp. 113 – 136.  
 
Crick, Bernard (2003). Introduction. In N. Machiavelli, and B. Crick (eds.), The 
Discourses. London: Penguin Books, pp. 15 – 70.  
83 
 
 
Constant, Benjamin (1988). Political Writings. Oxford: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Çelebi, Aykut (2012). Demokratik Bir Anayasanın Siyasal Yapıtaşları: Halk Egemenliği 
ve Siyasal Temsilin Demokratikleştirilmesi. Toplum ve Bilim, 124(1), pp. 36 – 60. 
 
Dent, Nicholas J. H. (2005). Rousseau. London: Routledge.  
 
Dietz, Mary G. (1989). Patriotism. In Ball, Terence, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson 
(eds.), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 177 – 193.  
 
Edgar, Andrew (2006). Habermas: the key concepts. London: Routledge.  
 
Forde, Steven (1992). Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli. The Journal 
of Politics, 54(2), pp 372 – 393.  
 
Froese, Katrin (2001). Beyond Liberalism: The Moral Community of Rousseau‟s Social 
Contract. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 34(3), pp. 579 – 600.  
 
Göztepe, Ece (2004). Yurttaşlığın Kamusal ve Ulusüstü Boyutu: Avrupa Yurttaşlığı ve 
„Gömen forumu‟ Örnekleri. In Meral Özbek (ed.), Kamusal Alan. Ġstanbul: Hill, pp. 321 
– 340.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Habermas, Jürgen (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
Habermas, Jürgen and Dews , Peter (1992). Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with 
Jürgen Habermas. London: Verso.  
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1998a). The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of 
Sovereignty and Citizenship. Public Culture, 10(2), pp. 397-416. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen (1998b). The inclusion of the other: Studies in political theory. In J. 
Habermas, C. Cronin, and P. De Greiff (eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press.   
 
Habermas, Jürgen (2001a). Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of 
Contradictory Principles?. Political Theory, 29(6), pp. 766 – 781.  
 
Habermas, Jürgen (2001b). The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. In M. 
Pensky (ed.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
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